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I. INTRODUCTION

Trade secret law must efficiently protect that which can be
Were the law to provide too little
considered a trade secret.1
protection, information protected as a trade secret would not be
created. Were the law to provide too much protection, competition
would be unnecessarily stifled. Only efficient protection, meaning
neither too little nor too much, appropriately addresses the unique
nature of trade secrets as intellectual property. Such a conclusion

1.
Roughly, that which can be protected as a trade secret is an unknown, commercially
valuable idea that has been taken by means that the law considers inappropriate; an idea that
has been misappropriated. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. Obviously, the scope of
trade secret law defines that which can be protected as a trade secret. Defining trade secret law
to protect ideas in a different way than the law currently does is the ultimate focus of this Note.

1269

1270

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57:4:1269

becomes increasingly necessary given the rising import of trade secret
2
law in the spectrum of intellectual property.
"It is the policy of the law, for the advantage of the public, to
encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise." 3 With
this, the first sentence in Peabody v. Norfolk, states began to recognize
that the law must protect commercial secrets to insure that those
secrets will be developed. 4 Despite the threats of preemption by the
federal patent scheme, 5 state trade secret law remains essential to

2.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) ("Congress, by its silence over
these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret
protection."); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991) (explaining that the holding of the trade secret case is important "because trade secret
protection is an important part of intellectual property, a form of property that is of growing
importance to the competitiveness of American industry"); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade
Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 & n.1 (1998) ('Trade
secrets are among the most valuable assets firms own today, and many courts and commentators
believe that the law of trade secrets is crucial to the protection of intellectual property."); Vincent
Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework
Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 71 (1999) ('The case reporters burgeon
with growing numbers of trade secret disputes, big and small, involving everything from
traditional commercial manufacturing processes, formulas and customer lists, through hockey
franchise information to magic tricks."); Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an
Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1633 (1998) ("Trade secrets law, once considered a
secondary source of intellectual property protection for less significant innovations, has evolved
into an important incentive for innovation in the information age."); Douglas Gary Lichtman,
The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693, 732-33
(1997) ("Federal law cannot keep pace with technology.... State law can mitigate the impact of
this type of delay, acting as a low-level, band-aid remedy during the period between the advent of
a new technology and its incorporation into the federal scheme."); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids
Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2438 (1994) ("Legal
theorists have particularly underestimated the important role of trade secret laws ... in
mediating between formal intellectual property regimes and free competition.").
3.
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457 (1868). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 305 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that "[tihe principal argument for a
monopoly [is] . . . as a way of encouraging innovation").

4.
Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457; Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically,
47 MD. L. REV. 1076 (1988) (noting the import of Peabody and the incentive to create justification
for trade secret law yet arguing that courts, in dealing with trade secret cases, ultimately have
"ethical intentions"). See generally POSNER, supra note 3, at 305 (noting that "[t]he principal
argument for a monopoly [is] as a way of encouraging innovation").
5.
The Supreme Court, in 1974, concluded that the federal patent law does not preempt
state trade secret law. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 493 ('Trade secret law and patent law have
co-existed in this country for over one hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and
the operation of one does not take away from the need for the other."). But, any significant
modification of state trade secret law may yet be considered preempted by the federal patent
scheme. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155-56 (1989)
(reaffirming Kewanee but making clear that "state regulation of intellectual property must yield
to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws"); infra notes
70-89 and accompanying discussion.
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providing incentives for innovation. 6 In addition, courts have noted
that trade secret law exists to institute a form of commercial morality,
7
to impose certain ethical standards on business relationships.
Absorbed by this potential of mandating morality, courts have molded
trade secret law in ways that frustrate the notion that trade secret
8
law should provide efficient incentives to create.
The ultimate focus of this Note is to identify the truly efficient
nature of the protection afforded by state trade secret law. 9 Further,
6.
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493 (holding that the federal patent laws do not preempt state
protection of trade secrets and noting the import of state trade secret law in encouraging the
production of information that that has "an important part to play in the technological and
scientific advancement of the Nation"); Bone, supra note 2, at 243 ("Trade secrets are among the
most valuable assets firms own today, and many courts and commentators believe that the law
of trade secrets is crucial to the protection of intellectual property."); Christopher Rebel J. Pace,
The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 427 ("In this ongoing battle
over information and innovation, numerous state laws play an important role by providing a
remedy for the misappropriation of a company's most valuable confidential information-its
trade secrets."); Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A
Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 BUS. LAW. 887, 887-88 (1988) (noting the distinction between
federal patent and state trade secret protection and identifying that "Corporate management has
a favorable view of trade secret protection because it is a cost-effective approach for protecting a
large percentage of a company's proprietary information").
7.
See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481-82 (noting that both "the maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind
trade secret law."); Wilson Certified Foods, Inc. v. Fairbury Food Products, Inc., 370 F. Supp.
1081, 1082 (1974) ("This protection given to trade secrets is a shield, sanctioned by the courts, for
the preservation of trust in confidential relationships."); Harry Wingo, Note, Dumpster Diving
and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret Law, 16 YALE L. & POLY REV. 195, 195-96 (1997)
('Trade secret law is complex and still emerging, but throughout its development, trade secret
law has consistently promoted minimum standards of commercial ethics. Indeed, promoting
commercial ethics is one of trade secret law's fundamental purposes."); Wiesner & Cava, supra
note 4, at 1077 (discussing the ways in which courts use trade secret law to police commercial
reality and noting the following: "Undoubtedly, courts believe that ethical standard are of some
assistance in applying trade secret principles, particularly in cases of first impression."); Ramon
A. Klitzke, Trade Secrets: Important Quasi-Property Rights, 41 BuS. LAW. 555, 557 (1986)
("Whatever theory ultimately justifies trade secret protection... it is clear that its home port is
fairness and honesty between business competitors.").
8.
See infra Part IV.A.2; IV.B.3.
9.
Many commentators focus intense economic analysis on the patent regime to the
exclusion of trade secret law. Further, those that do analyze the economics of trade secret law
fail to appreciate its potential as a broad and particularly efficient protectorate of intellectual
property. See, e.g., David Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 61, 62-66 (discussing the potential import of trade secret law as seen in cases like
E.I. du Pont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) and, after
conducting a basic analysis of trade secret law and its efficiency, noting that there is "ina sense
no law of trade secrets" and not discussing the ways in which trade secret law has been molded
so as to create inefficient results); Reichman, supra note 2. Professor Reichman, while
recognizing many of the efficiency gains of trade secret law, proposes substantial modification to
trade secret law to combat what he sees as a failure of trade secret law to provide innovators
with sufficient lead-time to recoup the costs incurred to developing the idea protected as a trade
secret. Id. at 2532-33 ("Now that classical trade secret law threatens cutting-edge technologies
with a chronic shortage of lead-time, legal theory must devise means to improve on nature by
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this Note seeks to identify the importance of efficient intellectual
property protection. 10 This Note contends that courts should abandon
those aspects of trade secret law more recently grafted onto its
efficiency underpinnings with hopes of mandating commercial
morality.
Part II first identifies the need for promoting efficient outcomes
through intellectual property laws. Part II continues by discussing
the extent to which the two most relevant forms of protection granted
to commercially valuable ideas, trade secret law and patent law,
create efficient outcomes. Part III identifies the current state of trade
secret law. Finally, Part IV presents a form of trade secret law that
appropriately promotes the law's efficient outcomes.

II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EFFICIENCY
Trade secret law, unlike any other form of intellectual
property, grants a property right that is limited by competitive
forces.1 1 As such, trade secret law, so long as it is untainted by the
potential of mandating commercial morality, is uniquely efficient.
rationalizing the delivery of the pro-competitive functions that this body of law is supposed to
perform."). This Note more concretely identifies the efficient nature of trade secret law than does
Professor Reichman. See infra Part IV. Further, while this Note proposes modifications to trade
secret law in hopes of providing for efficient innovation, the proposals are quite slight in
comparison to those sought by Professor Reichman. Compare infra Part IV with Reichman,
supra note 2, at 2544-57. This Note supports less substantial modifications primarily because it
does not accept Professor Reichman's premise that traditional trade secret law has failed in
providing sufficient protection to innovators not interested in or unable to garner protection
under the federal patent scheme. See Reichman, supra note 2, at 2532-33; infra Part IV. This
Note argues that trade secret law has not yet failed but has not been given the opportunity to
succeed.
10. Society benefits when monopoly power is reduced. To provide a sufficient incentive to
innovate, the law must grant innovators a right to exclude others from using their idea. See
infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text. By providing exclusivity, the law grants monopoly
power to innovators. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. This Note operates under the
assumption that society should correct the market failure inherent with information production.
Thus, the government must grant a monopoly to innovators so that society can benefit from
innovation. However, monopolies are inefficient and, as such, reduce social welfare. See infra
note 24 and accompanying text. Therefore, intellectual property regimes should seek to grant an
exclusive right only to the degree required to insure innovation. A more extensive grant of
monopoly power will further harm society in the way that all monopolies harm society, but will
create no additional benefit in the way of valued innovation.
Trade secret law more
appropriately limits the monopoly granted innovators than do alternative forms of intellectual
property protection, namely the patent scheme. See infra Part II.B. Therefore, focusing on trade
secret law as a protectorate of intellectual property provides the exclusivity that innovators
require yet limits the monopoly power granted so as to reduce to as small of a degree as possible
the harmful effects of the monopoly granted. Trade secret law provides efficient results.
11. See Pace, supra note 6, at 435 ("By allowing companies to maintain the confidentiality
of their valuable competitive information but permitting competitors to develop like information
by proper means, the tort [of misappropriation of trade secrets] strikes a crucial balance between
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Legal protection of intellectual property is absolutely
necessary.12 This result becomes clear when we consider the choice
facing innovators if the law did not provide protection for intellectual
property.13 Without possible legal protection, benefits accruing to
innovators from information developed after extensive expenditures
would continue only as long as innovators could keep this information
secret.14 Once the information became public, competitors would
begin to sell products, which use or embody the innovation, that would
compete with those developed by the original innovator. 15 Because the
competitors would not have incurred the substantial costs associated
with developing the innovation, those competitors would charge lower
prices than would the original innovator. 16 Thus, the original
innovator would be quickly priced out of the market.1 7 Faced with
such a legal regime, innovators would expect fewer benefits from new
innovations than they expect under the existing regime because of the
additional suppliers infused into the market. Also, innovators would
expect to incur higher costs attempting to maintain secrecy than they
currently expect. 18 Rational actors would be deterred from developing
encouraging each individual business to develop valuable new uses of information, and not
unduly discouraging the business' competitors from likewise developing valuable uses.").
12. Id.
13.

See generally ROBERT P.

MERGES ET AL.,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW

TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12-20 (2d ed. 2000) (noting competing justifications for intellectual
property yet concluding that "intellectual property in the United States is fundamentally about
incentives to invent and create" and making clear the import behind intellectual property by
discussing choices facing innovators were there no legal protection for intellectual property).
14. Id. at 13 (noting that, absent intellectual property protection, an innovator "will reap a
reward from that idea only to the extent that her competitors don't find out about it.").
15. Lichtman, supra note 2, at 701 ("Without intellectual property protection [a world
where information is available for public use as soon as the information is revealed], an
innovator would bring a new idea to market only to find that his competitors would quickly have
their own version of that same idea.").
16. MERGES, supra note 13, at 12-20 (identifying that, once information becomes public, "it
will prove virtually impossible to charge for information over the medium run."); Gordon L.
Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1451 (1967) ("If the innovation is available simultaneously to the
innovator and his competitors, the innovator will be unable to recover any of the costs of
innovation because the competitor's price will be determined on a basis which does not have to
take these development costs into account.").
17. MERGES, supra note 13, at 13-14 ("Competition will drive the price of the book toward
its marginal cost ....In such a competitive market, the author will be unable to recoup the cost
of writing the book.") (considering a problem common to all forms of intellectual property in the
context of copyrights); Doerfer, supranote 16, at 1451.
18. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974) (discussing the effect on
innovators were trade secret protection no longer available to avoid losing a trade secret to a
"faithless employee" and identifying that "inventive" efforts would decrease, innovators would be
forced to institute enhanced security precautions, and "organized scientific and technological
research could become fragmented, and society, as a whole, would suffer.").
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information at the rate it is currently developed. 19 Thus, the problem
necessitating the law's provision of additional protection is a lack of
natural exclusivity. 20 Without the ability to exclude free-riders from
profiting from one's idea, innovators cannot recoup experimentation
21
costs to the extent necessary to justify the decision to innovate.
Granting exclusivity to intellectual property through a legal
regime, although necessary to allow for innovation, presents
problems. 22 By precluding potential competitors from entering a
market, government protection of ideas creates a state-sponsored
monopoly regardless of the method of protection. 23
Because
19. Id.; MERGES, supra note 13, at 14 (noting that, were competition to work as described,
"authors may be expected to leave the profession in droves, since they cannot make any money at
it. The result, according to economic theory, is an underproduction of books and of other words of
invention and creation with similar public goods characteristics."); Lichtman, supra note 2, at
702 ("Knowing this [that competitors would be able to obtain the original ideas without incurring
significant development costs], few would want to be innovators, preferring instead to wait and
free-ride on someone else's good idea.").
20. Doerfer, supra note 16, at 1451 (noting that an innovation which (1) is "available
simultaneously to the innovator and his competitors" and (2) "require[s] investment above and
beyond the ordinary investment needed to exploit the innovation . . . will be subject to
appropriation and hence discouraged").
21. Id.; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1140
(2000) ("[W]ithout a legal protection system, creators will find it difficult to exclude free-riders
from appropriating the fruits of their labor and selling identical or very similar products in the
marketplace at a cheaper price.").
22. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989, 996 ("Granting authors and inventors the right to exclude others from using their
ideas, necessarily limits the diffusion of those ideas and so prevents people from benefiting from
them."); Lichtman, supra note 28, at 708 (noting that "monopolies engender societal waste"
because "monopolists earn producer surplus by restricting output and raising prices").
23. By monopoly, I do not mean the absolute monopoly of one seller in a given market.
Instead, I reference a monopoly to describe any entity that wields monopoly power, however
slight the power. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (characterizing the
federal copyright scheme as creating a monopoly over the copyrighted work); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 141 (1989) (characterizing the federal patent scheme as
creating a monopoly over the patented work); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 474 (characterizing
state law trade secret protection as creating a monopoly over the work protected as a trade
secret); Lichtman, supra note 2, at 704 ("A patent creates a simple monopoly."). But see John S.
Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2262-63 (2002)
(noting the argument that some scholars equate "exclusivity in the patent domain with the
(undesirable) textbook case of monopoly from Economics 101" but ultimately concluding that the
monopoly still exists to a degree); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729-38 (2000) (arguing that
legal scholarship prematurely considers all intellectual property rights as monopolies). To
Professor Kitch, an intellectual property right is an exclusive property right yet not necessarily a
monopoly. Id. at 1731. Exclusive property rights only amount to monopolies if the right is
extremely broad. Id. If fully extended, Professor Kitch's conclusion means that granting
intellectual property rights does not necessarily cause harm to society. See id. (noting that most
intellectual property rights, at least those that do not establish a monopoly, do not force society
to incur the "social welfare costs associated with monopoly"); POSNER, supra note 3, at 301-05
(discussing the economic consequences of a monopoly). However, an exclusive right to use an
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idea necessarily establishes a monopoly in the production of that idea and, consequently,
decreases social welfare. See id. at 299 ("An important example of impeded entry is the
governmentally protected monopoly-for example, a patent monopoly") (emphasis added).
Professor Kitch's conclusion rests largely on the notion that intellectual property law
typically protects a narrow idea the value of which can be recognized only if the idea is embodied
in some product. See Kitch, supra, at 1730, 1734 (noting (1) that a patent right is "most
plausibly characterized as a monopoly" but that such a characterization is accurate only "if the
claims cover all of an economically relevant market ...
" and (2) that the market that must be
considered for purposes of determining whether or not the market is monopolistic cannot be the
market for intellectual property right itself because there is no market for the right, only one
such right exists). The idea itself is not sold to consumers directly. Id. at 1734. Professor Kitch
contends that competing products typically perform functions quite similar to that performed by
the product embodying the protected idea. Id. ("Even here [in a market for a good whose
economically distinctive features fell within the claims of the patent], the patent may not confer
an advantage if alternative ... technologies are available at lower cost ....). Because the
intellectual property right cannot bar competition of this sort, Professor Kitch contends that
most intellectual property rights do not grant monopolies. Id.
If Professor Kitch is correct, the intellectual property laws would, in all instances in which
the exclusive right granted is too narrow to grant any monopolistic power to the innovator,
provide essentially no incentives to such innovators. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 996 ("In
economic terms, intellectual property rights prevent competition in the sale of the particular
work or invention covered by the intellectual property right, and therefore allow the intellectual
property owner to raise the price of that work above the marginal cost if reproducing it."). The
essential characteristic of a monopoly is the ability of the producer to charge a price for her
product above the marginal cost to producing such a product. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at
297 (discussing typical monopolistic market supply and demand curve and noting, within the
figure presented, that the monopolistic producer will charge a price above her marginal cost of
producing the product). If there is no monopoly, the producer, by definition, does not have this
ability. Id. at 298 (noting that competition makes a monopoly price, defined as a price above
marginal cost, "untenable"). If innovators cannot charge prices for products that embody
protected ideas that are above the marginal costs to producing such ideas, innovators cannot
recoup costs expended to develop the idea. See Lichtman, supra note 2, at 700-01 (noting that
society needs intellectual property protection because of the existence of "development costs,"
which Professor Lichtman defines as "all costs incurred in the production of an original
innovation that are neither repeated by the innovator in the production of a later copy nor
repeated by a competitor in the production of his first copy'). Thus, if Professor Kitch is correct,
intellectual property laws do not serve the function that traditionally justifies their existence.
E.g., id. Granting a monopoly is the only way that innovators can recoup their development
costs. Id. at 701.
Further, Professor Kitch's conclusion that intellectual property protection may not grant a
monopoly in any given product market negates the existence of markets for inputs to products.
Intellectual property laws necessarily grant some measure of an exclusive right to use an idea.
See Kitch, supra note 23, at 1729-30 (noting that "an intellectual property right, like all property
rights, is an exclusive right which enables the owner to exclude others from the use of the subject
matter of the right"). There is a market for this ability-the ability to use an idea. The law
grants a complete monopoly in this market. The decrease in social welfare resulting from this
grant of monopoly power is that which should concerns most commentators. Because of this
monopoly, intellectual property rights must be limited.
Even assuming arguendo that the only relevant market is the final product market,
Professor Kitch's concern relates to the extent of a monopoly created but not the existence of such
a monopoly. The absence of monopolistic power exists only in perfectly competitive markets,
considered by most economists to be an aberration. The ability to differentiate one's product in
any way, including variation by way of ideas embodied in a product, grants producers the ability
to generate a downward sloping demand curve. With such a demand curve, the producer charges
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monopolistic markets do not benefit from competition, monopolists are
Complete
able to charge higher prices at society's expense. 24
exclusivity 25 is, in most instances, not required to provide sufficient
26
incentives for innovators to develop ideas.
Nonexclusive information, 27 while of decreased value compared
to entirely unknown information, still retains significant value. 28 To
use an example with which most are familiar, consider "one of the
best-kept trade secrets in the world," the complete formula for CocaCola. 29 Most consumers of soft drinks understand that there is only
one soft drink that tastes quite like Coca-Cola. This exclusivity makes
the formula an extremely valuable asset. 30 Consider, however, the
a price above her marginal cost to producing such a product and, therefore, wields monopolistic
power. The ability to charge a price above one's marginal costs leads to decreases in social
welfare regardless of the extent of such power. Assuming that the only relevant market is this
product market, the law's grant of monopolistic power should be limited to whatever extent
possible.
Professor Kitch cannot plausibly conclude that intellectual property laws do not grant
monopolistic power in any market. Where there is monopolistic power, there is reduced social
welfare. Courts and commentators should strive to reduce such detrimental effects however
possible.
24. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 354 (4th ed. 1998)
(demonstrating that monopolies make society worse off); Lichtman, supra, note 2, at 708 (noting
that "monopolies engender societal waste" because "monopolists earn producer surplus by
restricting output and raising prices" and that "There is one significant drawback to using patent
monopolies to reward innovation: Monopolies engender societal waste.").
25. By complete exclusivity, I mean the sole right to use a given idea. In this context, one
without legal protection of intellectual property, complete exclusivity could be obtained only
through absolute secrecy.
26. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in
Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 536 (2001) (noting that the patent law bar against
independent discovery is unique within intellectual property schemes and contending that other
schemes that protect one who has independently discovered an idea, like trade secret law, are
more efficient); Michelle Armond, Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to
Motions for PreliminaryInjunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 117, 13847 (2003) ("[Tjhere is a growing movement among legal and economic scholars towards
increasing economic efficiency of the patent system by introducing a generalized independent
invention defense to patent law."); Leibovitz, supra note 23, at 2268-81 (proposing that the
patent regime protect multiple inventors, so long as each inventor can establish that she
independently discovered the idea at issue and concluding that such a regime would be more
efficient); Reichman, supra note 2, at 2439 (noting that the non-exclusive right granted by trade
secret law "normally provide those who develop unpatented, noncopyrightable innovation with a
period of natural lead-time in which to recover their investments...").
27. By nonexclusive information, I mean information that can be used by more than one
entity; information that is not absolutely secret.
28. MERGES ET AL., supra note 13, at 13 ("Ideas and information can also be used by many
without depleting the enjoyment of others.").
29. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D.Del.
1985).
30. Id. at 294 ("As an indication of the value the Company places on its secret formulae [for
Coca-Cola and all other beverages produced by the company], Keller [Coca-Cola's former Senior
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effect on consumers if Pepsi Co., a leading competitor of Coca-Cola,
were to obtain and begin producing a soft drink with the Coca-Cola
formula.
Given the additional producer, purchasers would not be willing
to pay the same price as they currently pay. Simple economics reveals
that the price must decrease as additional suppliers enter the market.
It seems unlikely, however, that consumers would no longer want, and
therefore would refuse to pay a premium for, a soft drink having the
Coca-Cola formula simply because there are two producers of such a
product. Given that consumers would still purchase both the CocaCola and the Pepsi product and that consumers would pay somewhat
of a premium for either, both producers would likely recoup the costs
incurred in developing the soft drink.
Thus, the economic
environment provides for the innovation, the soft drink formula is
created, yet the environment still allows consumers to avoid some of
the monopolistic rents they would face were there only one soft drink
31
producer with the Coca-Cola formula.
In sum, complete exclusivity with regard to information is not
justified because information retains substantial value with
incomplete exclusivity and complete exclusivity creates an
unnecessarily broad monopoly. The appropriate extent of exclusivity,
an efficient amount of exclusivity, establishes a monopoly only to the
extent that the monopoly is needed to insure that the idea will be
developed. 32 Beyond that efficient level of exclusivity, the law creates
Vice President and General Counsel] avers that the Company elected to forego producing CocaCola in India, a potential market of 550 million persons, because the Indian government required
the Company to disclose the secret formula for Coca-Cola as a condition of doing business
there.").
31. While not explicit in this discussion of the general economics of intellectual property,
benefits accruing to society by way of the wide dissemination of ideas also cut in favor of limiting
the exclusivity granted by the intellectual property regime. E.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 996.
32. See Lichtman, supra note 2, at 701-03 (proposing a model intellectual property regime
providing protection that, at a minimum, allows innovators to recoup development costs, but
ultimately concluding that an effective intellectual property regime may provide more
compensation to innovators). Professor Lichtman argues that development costs only represent
the minimum level of protection, not the efficient level of protection, because development costs,
as defined by Professor Licthman, do not include "risks of innovation" and because products with
similar development costs will not necessarily be valued by society to the same degree. Id.
Professor Lichtman contends that innovators must be compensated for these risks of innovation
and must also be allowed to benefit from society's value of the goods. Id. The costs to innovate
as identified in this Note do include the risks of innovation. Thus, development costs to
Professor Lichtman and costs to innovate discussed in this Note both include the cost associated
with potential failure (either because the development is impossible or because the market does
not value the good).
However, Professor Lichtman, in proposing a model scheme that provides enhanced
compensation to innovators of ideas with higher societal values ignores a substantial problem of
intellectual property protection. Id. Once the development costs of a given idea are recovered,
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a monopoly where monopoly is unwarranted and thereby restricts
competition and the efficient allocation of resources. 33 The law must
provide only limited exclusivity to information.
A. Ideas Protected Through the Patent Scheme
Currently, the law grants exclusivity to innovators in various
ways. For purposes of this discussion of trade secret law, the most
relevant methods of legal protection are state trade secret law and the
federal patent regime. 34 Patent law provides a chronologically limited
yet otherwise absolute right to exclude others from use of the patented
information. 35 Information protected by patent law cannot be used by
anyone for twenty years except under the authority of the patent
holder. 36 This period of exclusivity provides the innovator with a
limited timeframe during which she can charge monopolistic prices in
37
hopes of recouping the cost of developing the patented information.
Following the twenty years, the information previously patented is
an efficient intellectual property regime must eliminate protection. The innovator will develop
the product so long as she can recoup her development costs adjusted for the risks of failure.
Once armed with the idea, society is best off if the idea can be disseminated without limit.
Consider the effects if intellectual property laws only protected pharmaceuticals to the extent
necessary to recover the innovator's development costs. The drug would still be created but more
members of society would be able to benefit from the drug because, once the idea is disseminated,
the cost of the drug would be substantially lower.
33. See POSNER, supranote 3, at 44 (noting that patent law may very well induce "excessive
investment in inventing).
34. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-93 (1974) (contending with the
notion that federal patent law, not copyright or trademark law, may preempt state trade secret
law because of the similarities between the federal patent regime and state trade secret law and
concluding that state trade secret law appropriately supplements the protection afforded under
the federal patent regime by increasing the choices that innovators may rely on to find legal
protection for their invention); Friedman et al., supra note 9, at 62-66 (discussing the choices
facing innovators and comparing the protection granted the innovator under both patent and
trade secret law; notably not discussing either copyright or trademark law); Thornton Robison,
The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347, 349
(1983) ("In. the United States, there are two sorts of information which are protected by law
against free use: information which is patented and information which is given the legal label,
'trade secret.' "); Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 979 (1991) ("In effect, trade secret law seems to be a small-scale version of
patent law.").
35. Robison, supra note 34, at 350 ("A patent, then is entirely a creation of that body of law
which allows and enforces a legal monopoly on certain information for a certain time.").
36. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 ('The patent laws promote this
progress [of science] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.").
37. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480; United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
186-87 (1933) ("An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him... but upon the expiration of that
period, the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without
restriction to practice it and profit by its use.").
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revealed to the world. 38 The complete exclusivity granted for these
twenty years insulates the innovator from any attempts to develop the
patented information. 39 Effectively, the innovator avoids any and all
competition for the length of the patent term. 40 Once the patent
expires, competition works to eliminate the exorbitant economic rents
granted the patent holder and widely disseminates the once-protected
41
idea.
A significant problem with the patent regime is that the
exclusive right it creates lasts for twenty years regardless of the
market for the patented idea. 42 In other words, the most valuable
idea, under the patent scheme, obtains the same extent of protection
as a substantially less valuable idea. 43 The market has no role in
limiting the exclusive right granted to the patent holder during the
patent term. 44 Trade secret protection leads to more efficient results
because it allows market forces to limit the law's protection.
38. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 ("In return for the right of exclusion.., the patent laws
impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure."); Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. at
186-87.
39. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 490 ("While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the
trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, patent
law operates 'against the world,' forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a
significant length of time.").
40. Id.
41. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 ("In return for the right of exclusion.., the patent laws
impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure."); Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. at
186-87.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) ("[S]uch grant (the grant of a patent) shall be for a term
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed .. "); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra
note 25, at 536 (proposing that courts recognize independent invention as a defense to some
forms of patent infringement and noting that this scheme addresses a significant criticism of the
patent scheme, that "if the value of the invention is very large relative to R&D cost, the inventor
-may be over rewarded, and deadweight loss may be unnecessarily high.").
43. The more valuable patents to an innovator are likely the costliest patents to consumers.
The most valuable patent is that which allows the owner of such patent to charge a price for the
product encompassing the protected idea that is above the marginal cost of producing the
product encompassing the protected idea; that which grants the patent holder a more substantial
monopoly. As the extent of a monopoly increases, the extent to which the monopolist erodes
consumer surplus increases. See Lichtman, supra note 2, at 708-09. Professor Lichtman
appropriately concludes that a patent's value is also determined by the extent to which
consumers are interested in the product. Id. at 707-08 ("A final advantage to the patent system
is that it encourages only worthwhile innovation."). In this way, the market does determine the
value of a given patent. Id. However, the patent law provides the same extent of protection to
an extremely potent patent as it does an impotent patent. See U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Thus,
the patent holder's legal right is insulated from market competition and is identical regardless of
the social value of the patent.
Many
44. See U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 25, at 536.
commentators make the closely related point that the patent laws may lead to inefficient results
because the patent right is granted to the first to develop the patent, not necessarily the best
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B. Ideas Protectedas Trade Secrets and the Uniquely Efficient Nature
of Such Protection
Trade secret law enhances exclusivity and thereby increases
innovation by supplanting the precautions that an innovator must
take to guard the secrecy of her information. 45 Therefore, innovators,
when deciding whether or not to innovate, consider the benefits of the
information without being forced to consider the costs of maintaining
secrecy, costs that would be necessary to consider were the law not to
provide such protection. 46 Interestingly, however, the law protects the
innovator only if the information at issue has been obtained from the
innovator by means that the law considers to be misappropriation. 47
Here, the law introduces market competition as limiting the protection
48
granted.
Competing innovators can obtain the benefit of the information
if they so choose. This insures that the trade secret owner does not
achieve a completely exclusive right. 49 Competitors will seek to obtain
the type of information that grants the original innovator the most
user of the patented idea. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 3, at 2446-47 (proposing a new scheme
of protection for ideas that includes "prefabricated licensing provisions" in hopes to insure that
the patent right gravitates to its highest valued user). Trade secret law, because it does not
grant complete exclusivity but rather allows multiple users of the same idea, avoids this
significant problem of patent law.
45. Pace, supra note 6, at 440-41 ("This [trade secret protection] decreases the amount of
resources the corporation must spend on precautionary measures, thereby increasing the amount
of resources available to the corporation for innovation, the profitability of innovations, and the
overall investment in innovation.").
46. Id.; see infra notes 65-69. But see Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925
F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that an innovator must take precautions up
to the point at which the additional value of precautions equals the cost of such precautions).
47. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-90 (noting that trade secret protection is weaker than patent
protection because "trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and
honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering .. ");
E.I. duPont deNemours &
Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970) ("One may use his competitor's secret
process if he discovers the process by reverse engineering applied to the finished product; one
may use a competitor's process if he discovers it by his own independent research ....");
Chiappetta, supra note 2, at 78 ("The most important proper means [of appropriating a trade
secret] are: independent creation, reverse engineering ...and acquisition from public sources.").
48. POSNER, supra note 3, at 45-46 ("In effect, competition is substituted for patent law's
proof requirements and durational limitation as a check on excessive investment in maintaining
or in unmasking trade secrets."); Doerfer, supra note 16, at 1450 ("Still, existing contours of
trade secret law put sharp limits on the power of a trade secret proprietor to exclude competition
from the market. Even though those contours may not have developed as a response to the
dangers of monopoly, they considerably soften the potential monopolistic consequences of an
exclusionary power.").
49. Friedman et al., supra note 9, at 66-70 (noting that trade secret protection is limited by
the sorts of proper means by which one can acquire information and justifying this limitation
through economic analysis).
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substantial economic rents. The type of information that competitors
will seek to obtain is that which grants the original innovator the most
substantial value. Thus, competing innovators will focus on the
information for which consumers are forced to pay the most exorbitant
prices, the ideas that have markets most in need of the cost-reducing
effects of competition.
During the time that it takes competitors to obtain the
information, the original innovator can recoup the costs of research
and development by charging a price above marginal cost, a monopoly
price. 50 To recoup such costs, the innovator must be able to determine
the length of time it would take for competitors to obtain the
information. Only if the original innovator can determine the length
of time during which she can effectively charge a monopolistic price
will she be able to price her idea so as to recoup the costs of
development.
The law can protect multiple owners of the same trade secret. 5 1
Thus, both the original innovator and successive innovators will be
able to recoup development costs until the information protected as a
trade secret is generally known throughout the industry. Once the
information is generally known, it has virtually no value as an
innovation, so consumers pay the lower prices associated with a
thoroughly competitive market.
This discussion of trade secret law reveals that the exclusivity
it grants and the method for limiting this exclusivity lead to
substantially efficient results.
Courts and commentators fail to
recognize the efficient nature of trade secret law. Consequently,
commentators argue for and courts implement alterations in trade
secret law that upset the efficient balance.
In altering the
requirements of trade secret protection beyond that presented in the

50. Reichman, supra note 2, at 2521 ("First and foremost, reverse engineering provides
originators with an indispensable period of natural lead time in which to recoup their initial
investment and to establish footholds in the market."). Professor Reichman ultimately concludes
that the lead-time provided by trade secret law is insufficient, particularly with regard to recent
innovation, because of the ease with which such innovation can be reverse engineered. Id. at
2517 ("An innovative but unpatentable product of the new technologies thus tends to bear its
know-how on its face. The innovator consequently risks becoming as vulnerable to rapid
appropriation by second comers as the author of any published literary or artistic work.").
Through this analysis, Professor Reichman negates the possibility that the original innovator
may be able to recoup her costs given a short lead-time by raising the price she charges for the
product embodying the protected idea. See infra notes 121-127.
51. Armond, supra note 26, at 156-57 ("[M]ultiple parties may be the legal owners of the
same trade secret."); see Leibovitz, supra note 23, at 2267-81 & n.50 (proposing that the patent
regime protect multiple inventors of the same idea and equating the proposal with a trade secret
regime in which the innovator has "a right against reverse engineering," thereby revealing by
inference that trade secret law protects multiple innovators).
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following section, courts frustrate the efficiency created by the basic
elements of trade secret law.
III. CURRENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR TRADE SECRETS
The tort of misappropriation of trade secrets, the legal
mechanism through which courts protect trade secrets, remains a
state law phenomenon. 52 As such, there is no nationally recognized
definition of the elements required to obtain protection. 53 However,
the influence of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and, most prominently,
the first Restatement of Torts has led to a substantial amount of
consistent treatment.5 4 From these three sources, one can glean the
general elements necessary to invoke court-sponsored protection of
trade secrets: (1) the trade secret must be of a certain broadly
52. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974) (applying Ohio trade
secret law and holding that the federal patent scheme does not preempt state trade secret law);
Bone, supra note 2, at 247 ("Since its emergence in the middle of the nineteenth century, trade
secret law has developed primarily as a creature of state common law."); William E. Hilton, What
Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropriationof a Trade Secret, 30 IDEA 287 (1990)
('The law of trade secrets is a creature of state common law.").
53. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 2, at 247 (conceding that "trade secret doctrine varies from
state to state," but concluding that "the general rules" are similar); Pace, supra note 6, at 429
(noting that "state laws on misappropriation of trade secrets differ in important respects," but
concluding that all states have developed the law relying on "one or both of two similar models").
Some commentators call for federal trade secret schemes to combat the problems created by state
incongruency. E.g., Pace, supra note 6, at 446 ("[I]t is clear that uniformity deserves precedence
over state autonomy and experimentation. The primary justification for this preference arises
out of the free-flowing nature of information and the resulting havoc this creates for the trade
secret owner trying to determine in which state its secret will, or may, be misappropriated.");
Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 379
(1971) (arguing that state law is a "confused body" of law that has been "overworked" and
describing differing state by state treatment).
54. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433
(1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-43 (1993); Bone, supra note 2, at
247 ("Although trade secret doctrine varies from state to state, the general rules are
substantially similar in all jurisdictions."); Pace, supra note 6, at 429 ("While state laws on
misappropriation of trade secrets differ in important respects ... all are fashioned after one or
both of two similar models: the Restatement of Torts Section 757 and the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act."); David W. Slaby et al., Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept 'Efforts
Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 321, 323 (1989) (noting that elements do vary slightly from state to state but
observing the "generally required" elements to establish trade secret protection); Wiesner &
Cava, supra note 4, at 1078 ('The elements of the action [misappropriation of trade secrets] are
fairly well acknowledged."). Courts consistently cite either the Restatement of Torts or a state's
enacted version of the UTSA. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410,
421 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law and citing the Restatement of Torts); Weigh Sys.
South, Inc. v. Mark's Scales & Equipment, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Ark. 2002) (applying
Arkansas' version of the UTSA); Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d
366, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (applying Minnesota's version of the UTSA).
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characterized subject matter; (2) the trade secret must be secret; and
(3) the trade secret must be misappropriated. 55
Trade secret law can protect almost any sort of information
imaginable so long as the information has some competitive value. 56 A
commentator recently noted that courts have protected the following
as trade secrets: "engineering information, formulae, customer
information, sources for raw materials, processes, design manuals,
operating and pricing policies, market research studies, machinery,
computer software, and designs drawings and blueprints." 57 In fact, it
is the breadth of information that trade secret law can potentially
protect that both helped convince the Supreme Court, in Kewanee,
that the federal patent scheme does not preempt trade secret law, and
that made trade secret protection, as opposed to patent protection,
58
more desired by business managers.
"The essential characteristic of a trade secret [is] . . . secrecy." 59
Although canonical trade secret law considers any information that is
not generally known as sufficiently secret, courts have considerable

55. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437-38
(1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-43 (1993).
56. See Exparte Miltope Corp., 823 So. 2d 640, 644 (Ala. 2001) (applying Alabama's version
of the UTSA); Home Pride Foods, Inc. v. Johnson, 634 N.W.2d 774, 781 (Neb. 2001) (applying
Nebraska's version of the UTSA); A.M. Skier Agency, Inc. v. Gold, 747 A.2d 936, 940 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000) (demanding a showing of value to provide protection of information as a trade secret);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) ("A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."); UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985) ("Trade secret means information.., that (i) derives
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1993) ("A trade
secret must be of sufficient value in the operation of a business or other enterprise to provide an
actual or potential economic advantage over others who do not possess the information.");
Epstein & Levy, supra note 6, at 892-93 (noting that "the list of matters that courts have upheld
as valid trade secrets is extensive."); Comment, supra note 53, at 381 ("Generally, a trade secret
is any information of commercial value, not protected by patent, and not generally known or
accessible.").
57. Epstein & Levy, supra note 6, at 893 & nn.41-51.
58. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-84 (1974) (recognizing that the
breadth of subject matter protected under trade secret law "encourages businesses to initiate
new and individualized plans of operation, and constructive competition results," thereby, in
part, justifying the Court's conclusion that the federal patent scheme not preempt state trade
secret law); Comment, supra note 53, at 379 (identifying patent law's limited applicability and
noting that "industry has turned increasingly to whatever protection it can find under trade
secret law").
59. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723, 730 (Mass.
1970).
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difficulty applying this element. 60 Many courts consider six factors
when determining whether information claimed to be a trade secret
has an appropriate degree of secrecy:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his (the owner of the
information) business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of
the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease
or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
61
others.

Courts and commentators consider the third factor most important:
"the extent of measures taken ... to guard the secrecy of the
information. '62 In certain circumstances, discussed further below, 63
the undue emphasis placed on this factor interferes with the efficient
nature of trade secret protection. 64 Even without regard for the
reasonable precautions factor, trade secret protection will often hinge
on the extent to which the information at issue is secret.
Trade secret law only protects information against uses or
takings that the law considers unacceptable, i.e., against
misappropriations. 65 Typically, misappropriation comes in the form of

60. See, e.g., Slaby, supra note 54, at 323 ("Secrecy is an illusive and critical requirement for
the trade secret owner.").
61. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see, e.g., Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v.
Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Mass. 1972) (citing the Restatement of Torts and these factors);
B.C. Ziegler and Co. v. Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
62. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see, e.g., Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle, 317
F. Supp. 633, 637, 639 (W.D. La. 1970) (applying Louisiana law before Louisiana adopted its
version of the UTSA, citing the Restatement factors, and denying trade secret protection because
Wheelabrator has not taken reasonable precautions to protect the secrecy of this information)
("heelabrator's lack of precaution renders it undeserving of the equitable protection it now
seeks); Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Tech. & Mfg. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(citing the Restatement factors and noting that "the extent of the measures that the alleged
owner takes to guard the secrecy of the information is determinative of whether it is a trade
secret."); Klitzke, supra note 7, at 563 ("In a trade secret case, the plaintiffs efforts to maintain
secrecy are critical to trade secret status."); cf UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985)
(considering the extent of reasonable precautions as a distinct element-one demanded in
addition to secrecy); Secure Svs. Tech. Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354,
1361-62 (E.D. Va. 1989) (applying California's version of the UTSA and denying trade secret
protection to plaintiff because it failed to take reasonable precautions to maintain secrecy);
Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 657 F. Supp. 319, 326-27 (E.D. La. 1987) (applying Louisiana's
version of the UTSA and demanding that there be reasonable precautions taken to insure
secrecy in addition to requiring that the information be secret).
63. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
64. Succinctly put for purposes of this introduction to trade secret law, undue emphasis
given to the reasonable precautions requirement demands that innovators focus their efforts on
taking precautions rather than on further innovation of new ideas.
65. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (providing some guidance as to
actionable misappropriation); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (defining both
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a breach of a confidential relationship. 66 However, as made clear in
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, trade secret law does
67
protect against more than breaches of confidential relationships.
The law protects against appropriation of a trade secret by any means
courts consider improper. 68 While courts' definitions of "improper"
may vary considerably, the element guarantees that courts will not
hold liable one who obtains information sought to be protected as a
trade secret by either an independent discovery or by reverse
engineering. 69 The efficient protection of trade secret law demands
that more courts follow the precedent laid down in Christopher;courts
must broadly define misappropriation to encompass any method not

improper means and misappropriation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 40-43
(1939) (defining both improper means and misappropriation).
66. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a)-(b) (1939); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40(a)-(b) (1939); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438; see also, e.g., E.I. Du

Pont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (Holmes, J.) ('Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant
stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs...."); American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 728
F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the misappropriation element was satisfied because of
a breach of a confidential relationship); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953)
(premising liability for misappropriation of trade secrets on a finding of an implied confidential
relationship); Comment, supra note 53, at 383 ("Most of the cases have in fact involved
employees and breach of confidential relationship, not theft."). Many courts contend that
misappropriation may only come in the form of a physical trespass or a breach of a confidential
relationship. See infra notes 164-165.
67. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
68. Id. at 1014-15 (holding that misappropriation under Texas trade secret law constitutes
not only the breach of a confidential relationship but also the improper discovery of information);
see Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 & n.9 (1984) (holding that a trade secret
is property the taking of which must be compensated under the 5th Amendment and discrediting
the import of Justice Holmes' comment in Masland, see note 66, thereby making clear that trade
secret law protects against more than the breach of confidential relationships); Hilton, supra
note 52, at 292 ("As mentioned in these comments, the two most common defenses to an
allegation of misappropriation are discovery by independent invention and discovery bv reverse
engineering.").
69. Reverse engineering is defined by the drafters of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as
"starting with the known product and working backward to find the method by which it was
developed." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1985); id. at 438-39 ("Proper [nonactionable] means include: (1) discovery by independent invention; (2) discovery by 'reverse
engineering'...."); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) ("A trade
secret law, however, does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such
as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by
starting with the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development or manufacture."); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982)
("It is well recognized that a trade secret does not offer protection against discovery by fair and
honest means such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse
engineering, that is, starting with the known product and working backward to divine the
process."); Robison, supra note 34, at 351 ("A trade secret, however, may be discovered by
someone else, either as a result of independent research or of reverse engineering.").
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appropriately considered either independent discovery or reverse
engineering.
IV. WHAT SHOULD THE LAW BE?

To obtain trade secret protection, an innovator should need to
establish only two elements: (1) that the information is sufficiently
secret; and (2) that the defendant did not obtain the information by
either independent discovery or reverse engineering.
As the focus of this Note is constructing state trade secret law
so as to provide efficient incentives to innovators, the primary impetus
behind the proposed alterations in the law must be to enhance
efficiency. However, any alteration of state trade secret law must take
into account the potential preemption of state law by the federal
patent scheme.
"[S]tate regulation of intellectual property must yield to the
extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our
patent laws." 7° Before making this statement in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court had expressly
recognized in Kewanne that state trade secret law was an appropriate
supplement to federal patent protection. 71 The Court went on to
affirm its Kewanee holding that the federal patent regime does not
conflict with state trade secret law. But, the Court was faced with a
72
scheme that, like trade secret law, protected an unpatentable idea.
Given Kewanee and its affirmation by the Court in Bonito Boats, one
may naively conclude that state trade secret law cannot be modified in
such a way as to be considered preempted by the federal patent
regime. It seems more likely, however, that the Court, faithfully
applying Bonito Boats and Kewanee, could conclude that trade secret
law, if modified from its current form, could impermissibly conflict
73
with federal law.
70. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
71. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493 ("Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary,
States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets.").
72. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 155-56 (discussing Kewanee and noting the aspects of the
Kewanee decision that support the Court's reasoning in Bonito Boats).
73. Id. at 160 (holding that the Florida statute at issue was preempted by federal patent
law, in part, because the law restricted the ability of competitors to reverse engineer boat hulls);
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479 (defining the preemption question as whether Ohio trade secret law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of
Congress" (internal quotations omitted)); Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 652 (5th Cir.
1997) (citing Kewanee for the proposition that "state trade secret law cannot bar reverse
engineering or independent discovery" (emphasis added)); Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v.
Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997) ("In this regard, it is important
to note that reverse engineering is perfectly legal in a product not protected by a patent.');
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How do we draw the line between the permissible sort of
protection at issue in Kewanee, the Ohio trade secret law, and the
impermissible sort of protection at issue in Bonito Boats, a Florida
statute ultimately prohibiting copying of boat hull designs? In Bonito
Boats, the Court noted that "to a limited extent, the federal patent
laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free
for all to use. '74
So, impermissible protection is that which
substantially disrupts the balance, between what is and what is not
protected, that is established by the federal scheme. 75 In concluding
that trade secret law does not disrupt this balance, the Court found
most important that trade secret law does not protect information in
the public domain and that trade secret law provides substantially
less protection than does patent law. 76 From this, we may conclude
that (1) the federal patent laws virtually mandate that information
within the public domain remain free to use and (2) federal patent law
preempts any protection scheme that provides protection to the same
degree that patent law provides protection.
Just below the surface of the Supreme Court's intellectual
property preemption jurisprudence is the notion that intellectual
property laws cannot grant a property interest in information within
the public domain. 77
The federal patent scheme protects only
Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1455 (11th Cir. 1991) ("As recently as 1989
[referring to Bonito Boats], the Supreme Court has noted that trade secret laws cannot be used to
prohibit reverse engineering .. ");
Heald, supra note 34, at 969 (identifying consistencies in the
Court's treatment of federal preemption of state intellectual property laws through an economic
analysis of the incentive structure created by the state law. If the state law provides incentives
to an innovator that substantially alters the incentive scheme created by federal law, then the
federal law preempts state law).
74. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 151.
75. Id. at 152 ('Thus our past decisions have made clear that state regulation of intellectual
property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our
patent laws."); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479 ('The question of whether the trade secret law of Ohio
is void under the Supremacy Clause involves a consideration of whether that law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
(internal quotations omitted)); Heald, supra note 34, at 967 ("Although the federal patent statute
contains no express preemption clause, the Supreme Court has preempted state laws that
actually conflict with the goals of federal patent protection and upset the balance established by
Congress.").
76. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484, 489-90.
77. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) ("An unpatentable article,
like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and
sold by whoever chooses to do so."); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 23738 (1964) ("Under the federal patent laws it (Day-Brite's fixture protected by the state law at
issue) is ... in the public domain and can be copied in every detail by whoever pleases.");
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (announcing that the policy embodied in the federal patent laws
demands, among other things, that "that matter once in the public domain must remain in the
public domain" and concluding that state trade secret law, in part because it protects only
information not within the public domain, is not incompatible with the federal patent scheme);
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information that is novel and nonobvious. 78 These requirements
insure that society incurs the costs of monopoly only for truly
worthwhile or beneficial discoveries. 79 The Supreme Court has made
clear that any state law frustrating this federal policy must be
preempted.8 0 As made clear in Bonito Boats, the Court in Kewanee
must have considered the secrecy element vital to avoiding a
frustration of federal policy.81 Both traditional trade secret law and
the modified version presented by this Note include a substantial
82
secrecy element.
Further, the federal balance struck in the patent laws demands
that courts continue to recognize reverse engineering as an

Bonito Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. at 151 ("State law protection for techniques and designs whose
disclosure has already been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the
patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of further
innovation.").
78. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 150-51 (identifying the elements to patentability and
specifically noting that the "federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology
and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years").
79. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (concluding that Congress, in enacting
the 1952 Patent Act which included a nonobviousness requirement, agreed with Thomas
Jefferson that "only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new
and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly"); Bonito Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. at 147-48 (noting that Thomas Jefferson, the "driving force behind early federal patent
policy," and who "played a large role in the drafting of our nation's second Patent Act," one that
is "remarkably similar" to today's patent laws, "viewed a grant of patent rights in an idea
already disclosed to the public as akin to an ex post facto law, obstruct[ing] others in the use of
what they possessed before" (internal quotations omitted)); id. at 980 ("Both the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts
within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation
available to all.").
80. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 151 ("State law protection for techniques and designs
whose disclosure has already been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very
purpose of the patent laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of
further innovation."); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
81. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 155 (reaffirming Kewanee and noting factors critical to
the Court's conclusion in that case, including the Court's recognition that "the public awareness
of a trade secret is by definition limited"); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 ("[T]he policy that matter
once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible with the
existence of trade secret protection. By definition a trade secret has not been placed in the public
domain").
82. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475 ("The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be
of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business."); J.T. Healy & Son, Inc.
v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723, 730 (Mass. 1970) (considering the essential
aspect of a trade secret to be secrecy); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 ("A
trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise
and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage
over others"); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a) ("trade
secret may consist of any formula.., which ... gives him (the innovator) an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.")
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appropriate method of obtaining an innovator's secret.8 3 Reaching
such a conclusion becomes clear when one conducts an economic
analysis of the balance struck by the patent laws and the effect of
state trade secret law on the incentives presented to innovators, an
analysis that Professor Heald recognized as being crucial to
identifying a consistent thread between the Supreme Court's
If state law
intellectual property preemption jurisprudence.8 4
protected an innovator from losing her exclusive ownership right in an
idea even if competitors discovered her idea through reverse
engineering, innovators would be much more inclined to seek
85
protection under state law than federal law.
A rational innovator seeking to maximize her profit has two
substantial considerations: (1) which scheme provides the most
substantial protection; and (2) under which scheme is protection
easiest to obtain. Given the elaborate procedures of the Patent and
Trademark Office and the difficulty of establishing the elements of

83. See Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 160 (holding that the Florida statute at issue was
preempted by federal patent law, in part, because the law restricted the ability of competitors to
reverse engineer boat hulls); Kewanee, 470 U.S. at 479 (defining the preemption question as
whether Ohio trade secret law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objective of Congress" (internal quotations omitted)); Reingold v. Swiftships,
Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Kewanee for the proposition that "state trade secret
law cannot bar reverse engineering or independent discovery) (emphasis added); Entm't
Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997) ("In
this regard, it is important to note that reverse engineering is perfectly legal in a product not
protected by a patent."); Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1455 (11th Cir.
1991) ("As recently as 1989 [referring to Bonito Boats], the Supreme Court has noted that trade
secret laws cannot be used to prohibit reverse engineering .. ");Heald, supra note 34, at 969
(identifying consistencies in the Court's treatment of federal preemption of state intellectual
property laws through an economic analysis of the incentive structure created by the state law.
If the state law provides incentives to an innovator that substantially alters the incentive
scheme created by federal law, then the federal law preempts state law); Pamuela Samuelson &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 158285 (2002) (presenting various legal arguments in favor of reverse engineering and noting that,
implicit within the Supreme Court's holding in Bonito Boats, is a notion that the law accepts
reverse engineering as an appropriate method of obtaining another's idea).
84. Heald, supra note 34, at 961, 969 (noting that "[f]rom an economic perspective, the
Court's preemption decisions have not been contradictory" and that, under the analysis
presented in Sears, Compco, Kewanee, and Bonito Boats, "[pireemption occurs when analysis of
protection criteria reveals a direct conflict between state and federal patent law"); Lichtman,
supra note 2, at 715-16 (discussing the Supreme Court's intellectual property preemption
jurisprudence and noting that the patent laws do include a negative inference precluding the
states from establishing intellectual property protection "so great so as to undermine the
incentives created by the federal regime").
85. The system described is effectively the patent system without the expensive and timely
procedures required to first obtain a federally protected patent. Given that protection would be
similar, rational innovators would choose the less costly state protection and thereby
impermissibly intrude on the federal scheme.
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patentability, trade secret law clearly represents an easier scheme
86
under which an innovator could obtain protection for her idea.
If trade secret law prohibited reverse engineering, it would
render the patent scheme virtually superfluous. The patent laws
would exist only to protect ideas that are easy to independently
discover.8 7 However, such ideas are likely ineligible for patent
protection because
of the requirements
of novelty
and
nonobviousness s8 More importantly, these ideas are likely not very
valuable to society. Ideas that are easy to independently discover do
not, by definition, represent significant advances beyond the current
state of affairs.
Currently, innovators of any product that is either (1) easy to
independently discover, or (2) difficult to independently discover and
easy to reverse engineer, seek protection under the patent scheme.
Defining misappropriation so as not to include reverse engineering,
therefore, ensures that the patent scheme will not be rendered
superfluous. In addition, defining misappropriation so as not to
89
include reverse engineering promotes efficiency in trade secret law.
Consequently, reverse engineering should remain an appropriate
method of obtaining a competitor's idea.
In the following sections, this Note will develop the elements
mentioned above as appropriate alterations in the law of trade secrets,
contrast these elements with the current state of the law, and make
clear that focusing on these elements in the appropriate fashion will
provide efficient protection.
A. Secrecy
To provide efficient protection, secrecy must serve two distinct
functions. First, the definition of the element of secrecy must insure
that one cannot limit the use of information that is generally known. 90
86. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-16, 131-35; POSNER, supra note 3 (An innovator certain
of his idea's protection as a trade secret "will save the costs and avoid the uncertainties of the
patent route; and he will not have to disclose the process, as he would in a patent application,
thereby enabling his competitors to duplicate it once the patent expires").
87. Ideas difficult to independently discover would likely be protected under trade secret
schemes. Exclusive rights to use such ideas would not be jeopardized by the ability of one to
independently discover the idea because such a discovery is cost prohibitive.
88. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (setting forth novelty requirement); § 103 (setting forth nonobviousness
requirement).
89. See infra Part W.B.
90. This element is, of course, already included in the law. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475
('The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a
general knowledge in the trade or business."); Heald, supra 34, at 987 ("Along with the
requirement of business advantage, this [the notion that trade secret law protects only that
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Courts can determine what sort of information is generally known
with relative ease. Moreover, rational commercial entities will not
incur litigation costs attempting to protect generally known
information because competitive forces preclude those entities from
recouping these litigation costs. Therefore, courts would rarely be
faced with an attempt to assert exclusive ownership over information
that is generally known. Beyond insuring that generally known
information is not protected, the secrecy element must insure that an
innovator cannot obtain a monopoly over an intentionally revealed
idea.
1. Intentional Revelation
Most importantly, the secrecy element must also insure that
one who has intentionally revealed information so as to benefit from
its revelation cannot preclude another from using such information. 9 1
Intentionally revealing information represents a rational choice made
by the innovator that the information is more valuable when revealed
than as a secret, either because of the price paid to procure publication
or because of the goodwill related to the publication. If an innovator is
allowed to intentionally reveal information to a third party and then
assert exclusive ownership over that information against the third
party, the innovator obtains a windfall. The original innovator must
be held to her bargain; she must lose the right to assert ownership
over the information against the party to whom she has revealed such
information.
Courts often look to the circumstances surrounding the secrecy
of information to determine whether or not the innovator intended to
reveal her information. 92
Courts now police this line between
intentional revelation and maintaining secrecy by considering the
which is not within the public domain] provides some assurance that what is kept secret is
valuable and does not restrict a competitor's resort to the public domain.").
91. As discussed more fully later, courts' current use of the reasonable precautions
requirement attempts to police this line. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.,
925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[If the plaintiff has allowed his trade secret to fall into the
public domain, he would enjoy a windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because the
defendant took the secret from him."); Secure Services Tech., Inc. v. Time and Space Processing,
Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (E.D. Va. 1989) (denying protection of information as trade secret
because the plaintiff effectively revealed information to the government when selling that
information without taking reasonable precautions to maintain the secrecy after the sale (by not
reserving proprietary rights)).
92. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc., 925 F.2d at 179; Secure Services Tech., Inc., 722 F.
Supp. at 1361; Palin Mfg. Co. v. Water Tech. Inc., 431 N.E.2d 1310, 1312-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(denying protection of information as trade secret because the information was not the subject of
reasonable precautions to maintain secrecy; the information had been revealed in hopes of
improving the device for sale).
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reasonable precautions that one takes to maintain secrecy. 93 When
courts recognize that an innovator may have revealed information so
as to benefit from the revelation, focusing on the extent of precautions
that an innovator takes is a valid method of determining, by
circumstantial evidence, whether or not the innovator intended to
benefit from revealing the information at issue. If the court finds that
reasonable precautions were not taken, the court should not protect
the information as a trade secret because doing so, given that the
innovator intended to benefit from the revelation, grants the innovator
a windfall and unnecessarily restricts competition.
For example, in Secure Services Technology Inc. v. Time and
Space Processing, Inc.,94 the court denied trade secret protection
because the plaintiff had not taken reasonable precautions to
maintain the secrecy of the innovation. 95 The court did not consider
96
reasonable precautions relevant as a distinct element of the tort.
Rather, the court focused on the reasonable precautions that the
innovator, took to determine whether or not the information was
secret. 97 Specifically, the court considered reasonable precautions
relevant to determining whether or not the innovator intentionally
98
revealed the information at issue so as to benefit from the revelation.
The plaintiff, in Secure Services Technology, Inc., manufactured
and sold TEMPEST facsimile machines to "American and NATO
agencies and to qualified private government contractors." 99 The
defendant, recognizing that there were few suppliers of TEMPEST
machines, began research to independently develop the machine so
that it could enter the market. 100 The most significant hurdle facing
the defendant in its attempt to enter the market was that the
consumers of such machines demanded that all machines, regardless
of their manufacturer,
be inter-operable. 0 1
To achieve
93. Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 683, 698 (1980) (suggesting that the reasonable precautions requirement allows
courts to (1) identify what secrets are sufficiently secret and (2) demand that employers provide
notice to employees of those ideas considered trade secrets).
94. 722 F. Supp. at 1354.
95. Id. at 1361-62 ("Accordingly, the Court concludes that even assuming the protocol
variations are protectible proprietary information, SST's failure to take the necessary, minimal
precautions to safeguard this information when it sold the TEMPEST machines to the
government renders the information ineligible for trade secret protection.").
96. See id. at 1361 ("In this case, by selling its machine without reserving proprietary
rights, SST effectively disclosed its protocol variations.").
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1357.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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interoperability, the government-the consumer of all machinesprovided the defendant with the plaintiffs machine, which was the
plaintiffs trade secret. 10 2 The contract for sale between the plaintiff
and the government did not reserve any proprietary interest in the
machine for the plaintiff.10 3 The court held that this failure to reserve
an interest constituted a lack of reasonable precautions. 10 4 Therefore,
the plaintiff could not assert exclusive ownership rights against the
defendant.
In Secure Services Technology Inc., the court's examination of
reasonable precautions was determinative of whether or not the
plaintiff intentionally revealed the information at issue.10 5 Since
reasonable precautions had not been taken, the court concluded that
the information had been intentionally revealed.10 6 Given the context,
a sale of information to the government, the plaintiff likely benefited
from not reserving a proprietary interest in the information.1 0 7 The
government, recognizing the additional advantage it gained because
the plaintiff did not reserve a proprietary interest, likely paid
additional consideration to the plaintiff for the use of the machine.
Allowing the plaintiff to assert exclusive ownership rights over the
information would, therefore, allow the plaintiff to benefit both from
revealing the information, as well as from excluding others from using
the information, providing the plaintiff with a windfall. Consequently,
the court was justified in considering the reasonable precautions
taken to maintain secrecy.
2. Inefficient Developments in the Secrecy Element
Some courts place undue emphasis on the reasonable
precautions factor in determining whether or not the innovator is
entitled to trade secret protection.1 08 Specifically, many courts, who
claim to follow the Restatement of Torts, define secrecy solely by
102. Id. at 1359.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1361-62.
105. Id. at 1361.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1359.
108. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438 (including a reasonable precautions
requirement in the definition of a trade secret and thereby intimating that secrecy is insufficient
so long as reasonable precautions are not taken); Nationwide Chemical Corp. v. Wright, 458 F.
Supp. 828, 837 (M.D. Fl. 1976) (denying protection of information as trade secret even though the
information was largely secret because the plaintiff failed to take reasonable precautions to
maintain secrecy); Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 657 F. Supp. 319, 326-27 (E.D. La. 1987)
(applying Louisiana's version of the UTSA and demanding that there be reasonable precautions
taken to insure secrecy in addition to requiring that the information be secret).
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reference to the reasonable precautions taken to maintain secrecy. 10 9
As is made clear by the above discussion and as is intimated by the
first Restatement of Torts, reasonable precautions taken to maintain
secrecy are relevant only when the facts of a given case demand that
courts consider the reasonable precautions to determine whether
information has been kept sufficiently secret to warrant trade secret
protection.1 10 The secrecy element can, in most instances, be easily
established by considering the extent to which the information at
Therefore, the reasonable precautions
issue is generally known. 1
factor should be considered only when the court faces an innovator
who may have intentionally revealed information so as to benefit from
the revelation.1 1 2 The extent of precautions should have virtually no
relevance outside of this context. As an independent element, the
factor establishes an inefficient protection scheme where courts
demand reasonable precautions be taken when there is no concern as
to whether or not the information has been intentionally revealed.

109. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (contending for a consideration of reasonable
precautions only in the context of determining secrecy not as an independent element in addition
to secrecy); Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Tech. & Mfg. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (noting that "the extent of measures that the alleged owner takes to guard the secrecy of
the information is determinative of whether it is a trade secret.").
110. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. Reasonable precautions seem relevant only if the
party alleged to have misappropriated a trade secret claims that the original innovator-the one
from whom the secret was allegedly taken-intentionally revealed the information to the alleged
misappropriator. Most importantly, the existence of reasonable precautions cannot be the
method by which courts determine whether or not information claimed to be a trade secret is
sufficiently secret.
111. Multiple entities can and should have a right to exclude others, those that do not have
the same right to exclude, from using one's trade secret. Thus, courts should not demand
significant levels of secrecy. Given the relatively low bar established by the requirement, courts
should have little difficulty concluding that information is sufficiently secret.
112. See Secure Services Tech. Inc., 722 F. Supp. at 1361-62 (denying protection of
information as trade secret because the plaintiff effectively revealed information to the
government when selling that information without taking reasonable precautions to maintain
the secrecy after the sale (by not reserving proprietary rights)); Palin Mfg. Co. v. Water Tech.,
Inc., 431 N.E.2d 1310, 1312-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (denying protection of information as trade
secret because the information was not the subject of reasonable precautions to maintain secrecy;
the information had been revealed in hopes of improving the device for sale); Kitch, supra note
93, at 696-98 ("Why do the courts require that the plaintiff show, as a condition of recovery, that
he has expended resources keeping the information secret? Are not all such protective
expenditures wasteful? Property rights are not usually lost because the owner has not expended
Professor Kitch briefly discusses the reasonable
sufficient resources to protect them.").
precautions requirement and identifies two justifications for it. Id. First, the courts may focus
on reasonable precautions to insure "that there is a reasonable probability that the secrets are in
fact secret." Id. at 698. Second, courts may focus on reasonable precautions "so that employees
know that confidentiality is claimed for the information involved ..." Id. This Note contends
that focusing on reasonable precautions is unnecessary. The extent of secrecy necessary to
establish trade secret protection is minimal.
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This Note contends that the more efficient approach is to
demand that the law, instead of the innovator, provide the protection
needed to protect one's secret. 113 Not requiring innovators to take
113. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 159-89 (1987); POSNER, supra note 3, at 224-33. Misappropriation of trade secret should be
considered a "real" intentional tort, one in which the law promotes efficiency by not demanding
that the potential victim take precautions to avoid being injured. See LANDES & POSNER, supra,
at 150-53; POSNER, supra note 3, at 225-26. For unintentional torts and intentional torts which
Landes and Posner consider not economically distinct from unintentional torts, Landes and
Posner suggest that the potential victim should take precautions to avoid being injured. LANDES
& POSNER, supra, at 88-96 (noting the efficient outcomes presented by a theory of contributory
negligence); POSNER, supra note 3, at 185-92 (discussing theories of victim fault and generally
noting that the law promotes efficiency by demanding, in the context of unintentional torts, that
the law be "careful not to impair the incentives of potential accident victims to take efficient
precautions"). With regard to intentional torts that are economically distinct from unintentional
torts, characterized as "real" intentional torts, however, Landes and Posner suggest that the
victim fault should have no relevance to a determination of liability. LANDES & POSNER, supra,
at 149-54; POSNER, supra note 3, at 224-28. Posner and Landes define a "real" intentional tort as
one that involves a coerced transfer of wealth as distinct from a "conflict between legitimate
(productive) activities." POSNER, supra note 3, at 225-26; see LANDES & POSNER, supra, at 14953.
Both in form and in substance misappropriation of trade secrets should be treated as a "real"
intentional tort. One who misappropriates a secret does not do so inadvertently while
Landes and Posner suggest that
conducting otherwise socially advantageous behavior.
unintentional torts can be differentiated from "real" intentional torts, those that do not require
the potential victim to take action to avoid, by noting that the tortfeasor can commit a "real"
intentional tort only by taking affirmative steps to effect a harm while a tortfeasor can commit
an unintentional tort by failing to take affirmative steps, such as sufficient precautions.
POSNER, supra note 3, at 225-26; see LANDES & POSNER, supra, at 149-53. Further, given the
proximity of trade secret misappropriation to conversion-in fact, many courts characterize the
tort of misappropriation of trade secrets as conversion of trade secrets-and Posner's explicit
conclusion that conversion is a "real" intentional tort, misappropriation of trade secrets should be
considered a "real" intentional tort. See Penalty Kick Mgmt. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284,
1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (characterizing a case involving trade secret misappropriation as
"conversion of trade secret information"); POSNER, supra note 3, at 225 (characterizing
conversion as one of a "set of intentional torts that are economically distinct from unintentional
torts"). Thus, misappropriation of trade secrets is a "real" intentional tort for which the law
should not demand that the potential victim take precautions to avoid being injured.
Professor Landes and Judge Posner, along with David Friedman, have intimated that trade
secret law should not demand that an innovator take reasonable precautions to maintain the
secrecy of her information. See Friedman et al., supra note 9, at 69-71 (concluding that the court,
in E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), reached the
correct result in holding the defendant's liable for trade secret misappropriation because
"[d]enial of legal protection might induce firms in du Pont's [the Christopher plaintiffs] position
to invest heavily in roofing over construction sites .... "). However, earlier in the Friedman
piece, the authors conclude that reasonable precautions are appropriate to avoid loss by accident
or reverse engineering. Id. at 69 ("[E]xpenditures on preventing its (the trade secret) loss by
accident or reverse engineering are likely to be productive."). Thus, Friedman, Landes, and
Posner suggest that some precautions are economically valid while others are not. Id. at 69-71.
One is left to decipher what amounts to appropriate precautions. In addition, the import of this
conclusion that precautions are not necessary to avoid theft is not fully addressed in the
Friedman piece. Id. at 66-71 (discussing positive economics of trade secret law but avoiding any
normative statements as to what the law should be). This Note more fully explains the
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reasonable precautions to avoid losing exclusive rights to use their
trade secrets promotes efficiency because it insures that neither the
original innovator nor the competitor seeking to obtain the trade
114
secret undertake wasteful activities.
If a competitor wants to obtain an innovator's trade secret, the
parties can reach an efficient agreement by operating through the
market. 115
Generally, imposing liability for trade secret
misappropriation requires that parties bargain through the market
rather than seek to obtain commercial secrets without the innovator's
consent. 116 Imposing liability without regard to the actions of a victim,
without concern for reasonable precautions, allows the innovator to
avoid the inefficient and potentially costly undertaking of providing
such precautions. 117
Innovators should focus on innovating.
Requiring an innovator to take reasonable precautions to insure the
secrecy of her idea is inefficient.
B. Misappropriation
To achieve an efficient level of trade secret protection, courts
must broadly define misappropriation so as to encompass all methods
by which one may obtain information except those methods that can
appropriately be characterized as independent discovery or reverse
engineering.
Through the misappropriation element, courts can
utilize market forces to limit the monopoly right granted to an
innovator. Through this element, courts can infuse competition into
the law's protection of commercial secrets.
Essential to trade secret law's uniquely efficient protection is
the notion that competitors will seek to obtain the secrets considered
inefficiency of the reasonable precautions requirement and affirmatively provides a framework,
one without the reasonable precautions requirement, for enhancing the efficiency of trade secret
law.
114. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 149-53; POSNER, supranote 3, at 226.
115. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 154 (noting that "real" intentional torts are
effectively a transaction that is not value maximizing); POSNER, supra note 3, at 226 ("Such
conduct (intentional torts that operate as coercive transfers) is inefficient because it violates the
principle that when market transaction costs are low, people should be required to use the
market if they can and to desist from the conduct if they can't.").
116. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 154 (noting that "real" intentional torts are
effectively a transaction that is not value maximizing); POSNER, supra note 3, at 226 ("Such
conduct (intentional torts that operate as coercive transfers) is inefficient because it violates the
principle that when market transaction costs are low, people should be required to use the
market if they can and to desist from the conduct if they can't.").
117. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 154 (noting that liability does not hinge on the
victim of an intentional tort taking action to avoid injury); POSNER, supra note 3, at 226
(considering all costs that the potential victim would incur with the intent of protecting against
injury as socially wasteful).
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most valuable, those that grant the original innovator the most
extensive and socially detrimental monopoly rights. Competitors in
any given industry will seek to obtain secrets used by a member of
that industry to obtain a competitive advantage.
The exclusive
knowledge controlled by the initial innovator of a given idea will grant
that innovator the potential of realizing excessive profits, of exercising
monopolistic power over a given market. The existence of these profits
will pique the interest of competitors. Thus, competitors will seek to
obtain the secret from which the original innovator is profiting.
Rational actors will seek to obtain ideas protected as trade
secrets through whatever means possible. 118
To reduce the
detrimental aspects of the exclusive right granted the innovator,
consumers desire any means by which one could obtain such
information to be acceptable.11 9 However, because allowing any
means to be acceptable would largely eliminate the ability of the
innovator to recover her development costs, the law cannot so casually
define misappropriation to encompass all means by which one may
obtain a commercial secret.
When considering the misappropriation element for the
purpose of establishing an efficient regime, it is important that those
actions considered not to constitute misappropriation be actions for
which the innovator can appropriately estimate the length of time it
will take a competitor to enter the market with a competing
innovation. The original innovator must be able to determine her
lead-time. With such knowledge, the original innovator can price the
innovation so as to recoup the costs she incurred developing the idea
before a competitor can enter the market.
If competitors could obtain the idea by unpredictable means,
the original innovator would not be able to estimate the length of her
monopoly and would, thus, not be able to price her idea so as to recoup
her development costs. Faced with a regime in which the original
innovator would experience substantial risk in recouping her costs,
she would include the risk of not recouping her costs into the price of
her idea. As such, the original innovator would demand a more
substantial monopoly right-one of potentially greater length or one of
more extensive exclusivity. A more substantial monopoly would harm

118. All means, those leading to and not leading to legal liability, will be considered. Means
leading to liability-those means considered sufficient to constitute misappropriation-will be
disregarded if and only if the costs associated with the potential punishment multiplied by the
probability of such punishment outweigh the estimated benefit of using the secret at issue.
119. This, of course, assumes that the idea has been developed initially. If the idea had not
been developed, rational consumers would concede that the law must grant a degree of
exclusivity so that the idea will be developed.
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society. The most efficient result, therefore, can only be achieved if
the law allows competitors to obtain the idea in whatever way possible
so long as the length of time it would take to obtain the idea through
allowable methods can be estimated.
Given that the market determines the innovator's output and
pricing, simply knowing the length of time during which one will be
the sole producer of an innovation may be insufficient to allow the
innovator to recoup her development costs. If, for example, one's leadtime can be estimated but it is estimated to be quite short, the market
may preclude the innovator from raising her price to a level
adequately above the marginal cost of producing her product such that
she can fully recoup her development costs. For this reason, many
scholars have considered the length of lead-time, rather than the
ability of the innovator to estimate such lead-time, as most essential
to ensure that the market grants the innovator the ability to recoup
120
her development costs.
Most prominently, Professor Reichman contends that the
current technological environment limits the amount of lead-time so
much so that modifications to existing intellectual property schemes
must provide artificial lead-time. 121 According to Professor Reichman,
technological advances in today's environment are expensive to
independently discover yet, because of more societal focus on tools
needed to quickly reverse engineer given products, relatively easy to
reverse engineer. 122 Thus, Professor Reichman's proposed intellectual
property paradigm focuses on providing innovators with additional
lead-time so they can fully recoup their development costs. 123
Professor Reichman's concludes that the length of lead-time, not the
120. See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1208 (2000) (proposing to modify patent law to insure that the patent right
gravitates to the most valued user by recognizing a fair use defense while noting that "[I]f the
R&D investment is quite large in absolute dollars, the patentee may require a certain lead-time
in the market to allow it to recoup both its investment and a reasonable return thereon");
Reichman, supra note 2, at 2506 (generally discussing the importance of the length of lead-time
in allowing innovators to recoup their development costs and proposing a new protection scheme
that provides artificial lead-time because the enhanced ability of firms to reverse engineer
products to decipher trade secrets has eliminated much of the natural lead-time that the
innovator demands to recoup her costs to innovate).
121. Reichman, supranote 2, at 2432.
122. Reichman, supra note 2, at 2525 ("[C]lassical trade secret law regulates the pace and
direction of ordinary competition, built upon routine or incremental innovation by: (1) providing
natural lead-time, (2) requiring second comers to share directly or indirectly in the costs of
research and development, and (3) avoiding abusive licensing constraints on the use of
unpatented information. This standard formula for healthy competition breaks down under
modern conditions, however, because of the generalized contraction of lead-time in the
commercialization of applied know-how identified above ... .
123. Id. at 2529-57.
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ability of an innovator to accurately estimate such lead-time, is most
relevant. 124
Professor Reichman supports his notion that existing
intellectual property regimes do not provide sufficient lead-time by
identifying the existence of numerous "hybrid" legal regimes. 125 In
other words, Professor Reichman concludes that the existence of
alternative methods of protection tends to show that more traditional
126
protection schemes, like trade secret and patent law, are ineffective.
However, he fails to consider other plausible justifications for the
First, the
existence of these alternative protection schemes.
alternative protection schemes may exist because current schemes
provide no lead-time. Second, these alternative legal regimes may
exist because innovators desire and therefore lobby for protection
beyond merely the efficient level of protection. Given alternative
justifications for the existence of these hybrid schemes, Professor
Reichman's focus on the concern that traditional trade secret law
provides an insufficient length of lead-time may be misplaced.
As exemplified by Professor Reichman, those scholars wholly
concerned with the length of lead-time do not sufficiently address the
notion that an innovator may be able to recoup most of her
development costs as long as she can estimate her lead-time. 127 There
still remains, however, the concern that providing for some lead-time
that can be estimated by the innovator will be insufficient because of
market constraints.
The inability of an innovator to recoup her development costs
because of a short lead-time will be most acute when the innovator
has developed a product expensive to independently discover yet
inexpensive to reverse engineer. After developing such a product, the
124. Scholars' focus on the amount of lead-time does not necessarily lead one to conclude that
the existence of lead-time is not more relevant. Discussing the need to extend the length of leadtime may be a way for scholars to note the absence of any lead-time. Because scholars do not
address the existence of lead-time and the length of such lead-time independently, one cannot
Given, however, the
easily decipher which factor is more important to their analysis.
prominence of Professor Reichman's discussion and his explicit conclusion that the current trade
secret scheme is insufficient because it fails to provide a sufficient amount of lead-time, one may
most plausibly conclude that scholars discussing lead-time are concerned primarily with the
extent and not the existence of it. Therefore, the proposal presented by this Note may be
considered by some scholars to be insufficient because of its primary focus on the existence of
lead-time. The distinction between the existence and length of lead-time demands further
analysis now presented.
125. Id. at 2455-2504. A "hybrid" regime is one that falls between the most popular
copyright and patent schemes. Id. at 2444 (noting that a hybrid legal regimes have been enacted
to provide exclusivity to innovations that fall outside of the traditional patent and copyright
schemes).
126. Id. at 2504.
127. See id.
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innovator may seek protection under the patent scheme. In fact, given
the complete exclusivity provided by the patent scheme, an innovation
that can be independently discovered only with great cost but can be
easily reverse engineered seems most appropriately protected under
the patent laws. 128 If, however, the innovation does not meet the strict
standards of patentability, the innovator will be unable to obtain legal
protection for her innovation. 129 Given the sort of innovation falling
into this category, no protection may be the most efficient result. The
innovation most likely will not receive patent protection because it
lacks the novelty or nonobviousness that the patent law requires. 30
The innovation cannot obtain adequate protection as a trade secret
because consumers do not demand the product enough so that the
innovator can recoup her development costs during the short period of
time that it takes competitors to reverse engineer the competitor's
product.
Intellectual property laws should not provide incentives to
innovators to undertake significant development costs for relatively
unwanted products. Ultimately, trade secret law may provide efficient
outcomes by denying protection to an idea that does not provide a
substantial enough monopoly right to allow the innovator to recoup
her development costs. Therefore, when determining which actions
should not constitute misappropriation, the primary focus must be
identifying those actions for which the innovator can accurately
estimate the time it would take for a competitor to duplicate the
innovation. While insuring that innovators can estimate their leadtime is most important, it is possible that market constraints may
keep an innovator from recouping the development costs of an
innovation that would benefit society.
To respond appropriately to Professor Reichman's concern, the
modifications to trade secret law's misappropriation element proposed
by this Note focus on the extent to which an innovator can accurately
estimate the length of time it will take a competitor to obtain the
protected idea through the activity considered not to constitute
misappropriation.
The discussion proceeds with one significant
assumption: the initial innovator's cost to develop the idea will
positively correlate with the difficulty of obtaining the protected idea
through the activity considered not to constitute misappropriation.
128. Given the patent law's bar against reverse engineering, a product that can be easily
reverse engineered would not be suited for protection under trade secret laws.
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (setting forth the novelty requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 103
(setting for the nonobviousness requirement).
130. Only two elements of the five elements of patentability are addressed here because
these two represent the most significant bars to patentability.
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This analysis reveals that two methods of obtaining a protected idea
should be considered not to constitute misappropriation: (1)
independent discovery 13 1 and (2) reverse engineering.
1. Independent Discovery
Independent discovery should be an allowable method of
obtaining an idea that another innovator protects as a trade secret. 132
The original innovator can accurately estimate the length of time it
would take another to independently discover the idea. 133 Further, the
trade secrets most expensive to initially discover are those trade
secrets that a competitor will have the most difficulty independently
developing. As such, the original innovator will be certain to have
34
some length of time to recoup the costs of innovating.
While sufficient to insure that valuable ideas are developed,
the monopoly granted by an efficient trade secret scheme, one that
recognizes independent discovery as an appropriate method of
obtaining another's idea, will be limited by competitors independently
developing the idea protected as a trade secret. The secrets most
sought after will be those for which the original innovator extracts the

131. Generally, independent discovery occurs when an innovator uses her own resources to
develop an idea without relying in any way on the original innovator's efforts. E.g., Armond,
supra note 26, at 139 (defining independent invention as "when an entity endeavors to produce a
technological innovation independently, expending the R&D costs necessary to develop the
innovation from the prior state of the technological field").
132. Beyond the benefits of allowing one to independently discover an idea as described in
this Note, such ability largely avoids the socially wasteful race to develop an idea first. Much of
the discussion of this race comes from the context of the patent scheme. E.g., John S. Leibovitz,
Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2268 (2002) (proposing
modifications to the patent regime so that independent discovery is a defense to patent
infringement); Armond, supra note 26, at 121-22 (proposing an independent invention defense to
avoid specifically a preliminary injunction); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 26, at 536-42
(conducting economic analysis of the independent discovery defense and noting that such a
defense furthers the ability of the market, by complementing use of licenses, to allow the right to
use a protected idea to go to the highest valued user). The economic theory presented by
Professors Maurer and Scotchmer is well beyond the scope of this Note. However, the general
discussion of the independent discovery defense reveals the economic advantages of allowing
independent discovery.
133. The innovator knows just how long it took her to discover the idea. Thus, she must be
able to determine, with some degree of accuracy, how long it would take for another to
independently discover the idea. If a competing innovator had been secretly developing the idea
at the same time as the original innovator-the original innovator reduced the idea to a more
marketable form first-the original innovator may not be sufficiently cognizant of the competing
innovator's efforts. Otherwise, the original innovator will have a fair estimate of the length of
time it would take for a competing innovator to develop the innovation.
134. For this reason, allowing one to obtain an idea protected as a trade secret through
independent discovery addresses the concern that the length of lead-time is most important in
allowing an innovator to recoup her development costs.
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most exorbitant monopolistic rents. In these markets, society most
needs competition. Once developed by the second innovator, the idea
will be protected until another innovator independently develops the
idea. The law will provide protection to successive developers until
the market for the idea is saturated to the extent that the idea can be
considered generally known and no longer eligible for protection as a
trade secret.
2. Reverse Engineering
Along with independent discovery, the law should allow a
competitor to obtain an idea protected as a trade secret through
reverse engineering. Most importantly, an innovator can estimate the
length of time it would take a competitor to reverse engineer the
innovator's idea. 135 As such, the innovator can price her idea so as to
recoup her development costs. Further, it seems likely that the
difficulty of independently discovering the idea correlates with the
difficulty of reverse engineering the idea. For the ideas more difficult
to independently discover, the innovator will have a longer
opportunity to recoup the costs of her investment. Therefore, the
innovator will likely be able to recoup her development costs.
Admittedly, the difficulty of independently developing the idea
may not correlate with the difficulty of reverse engineering the idea.
The first innovator to develop an idea answers many of the difficult
questions initially inhibiting the idea's development. Once these
questions are answered, the innovation may be much easier to
achieve. So long as there is some lead-time, however, the length of
that time is less relevant than is the ability of the innovator to
estimate the amount of that time.
In addition, courts and
commentators uniformly recognize the benefit of reverse engineering
to promoting innovation through the dissemination of ideas. 136

135. The original innovator is sufficiently familiar with her idea and/or the product
embodying such idea that the innovator should be able to determine how long it will take
another to reduce the product sold on the marketplace to the valued idea.
136. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc,, 489 U.S. 141, 160-61 (1989) ("Reverse
engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain often leads to significant
advances in technology.") ('Moreover, as we noted in Kewanee, the competitive reality of reverse
engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to develop inventions that
meet the rigorous requirements of patentability."); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 83, at
1575, 1590 (generally presenting both economic and legal arguments in favor of reverse
engineering and specifically noting that "a right to reverse engineer has a salutary effect on price
competition and on the dissemination of know-how that can lead to new and improved
products"); Reichman, supra note 2, at 2521-22 (noting that reverse engineering creates the
following benefits to "the innovative community's overall costs of research and development": (1)
"provides originators with an indispensable period of natural lead time in which to recoup their
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3. Efficient Examples and Inefficient Treatment
Some courts have invoked the misappropriation element for the
proper purpose: to avoid holding liable one who develops a trade secret
through reverse engineering or independent discovery. The most
prevalent example is the oft-cited and oft-misunderstood Christopher
case. 13 7 Many more courts, however, consider the misappropriation
element to be the appropriate avenue through which the law can
mandate some form of commercial morality. 138 As such, many courts
conclude that misappropriation occurs only through independent legal
wrongs such as physical trespass or breach of a confidential
relationship.1 39 The general intuition and the result in Christopher,
however, represents the way in which trade secret law can achieve an
efficient measure of protection.
In Christopher, the defendants obtained the plaintiffs trade
secret by taking aerial photographs of the plaintiffs facility.1 40 The
defendants had no existing relationship with the plaintiff, and because
the photographs were taken from the air, the defendant did not
physically trespass on the plaintiffs property. 141
Further, the
defendants did not obtain the secrets at issue through either
initial investment and to establish footholds in the market"; (2) "entitles fair followers who are
willing to defray the costs of mastering an innovator's undisclosed know-how to compete on
advantageous terms with the innovator by exploiting the costs reductions, technical
improvements, and new applications that reverse engineering reveals"; (3) allows costs of
innovation to be borne by both original innovators and "fair followers," those who reverse
engineer, by fueling each other's innovation; (4) "unfair followers," those who do not reverse
engineer but copy in other ways, "nonetheless remain liable to contribute to the total costs of
research and development whenever courts find that they have breached the standard
agreement," the agreement to follow trade secret norms that copying, not reverse engineering, is
improper).
137. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
138. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
(Holmes, J.) ("Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process
of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs .... ); American
Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 728 F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the misappropriation
element was satisfied because of a breach of a confidential relationship); Smith v. Dravo Corp.,
203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953) (premising liability for misappropriation of trade secrets on a
finding of an implied confidential relationship); Comment, supra note 53, at 383 ('Most of the
cases have in fact involved employees and breach of confidential relationship, not theft.").
139. See supra note 138.
140. Christopher,431 F.2d at 1013.
141. Id. at 1014 ("The Christophers [the defendants] argued both at trial and before this
court that they committed no 'actionable wrong' in photographing the DuPont facility and
passing these photographs on to their client because they conducted all of their activities in
public airspace, violated no government aviation standard, did not breach any confidential
relation, and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal conduct. In short, the Christophers
argue that for an appropriation of trade secrets to be wrongful there must be a trespass, other
illegal conduct, or breach of a confidential relationship.").
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independent discovery or reverse engineering. 142
The court
recognized, therefore, that it faced a unique question in the context of
trade secret law: should misappropriation be defined more broadly
than an independent legal wrong, i.e. breach of duty or physical
trespass? 143 Because the law's "tolerance of the espionage game must
cease when the protections required to prevent another's spying cost
so much that the spirit of inventiveness is dampened," the court
concluded that misappropriation must constitute more than other
144
legal wrongs.
In a relatively short opinion, the Christopher court did not
conduct the economic analysis presented by this Note. As such,
Christopher cannot be cited expressly for the proposition that trade
secret law considers improper, and thus actionable, all conduct by
which one obtains information protected as a trade secret except for
independent discovery and reverse engineering. 45 However, the
court's intuition that trade secret law exists to further the "spirit of
inventiveness" allows commentators to provide courts with evidence of
just what does dampen the spirit of inventiveness.1 46 This Note and,
specifically, the definition of misappropriation developed by this Note
best facilitate the "spirit of inventiveness" which justified the
Christophercourt's conclusion.
The Christopher case has engendered much debate in trade
secret law. The difficulty with the opinion stems from the somewhat

142. Id. at 1013-14.
143. See id. at 1014 ("It is true, as the Christophers assert, that the previous trade secret
cases have contained one or more of these elements [trespass, breach of confidential relationship,
or other independent wrong]."); Chiappetta, supra note 2, at 82-83 (citing Christopheras "the
best known discussion of' whether or not misappropriation should include "non-criminal or nontortious 'bad' acts"); Bone, supra note 2, at 297 (citing Christopher as being representative of a
category of trade secret cases where there has been neither a breach of confidence or a violation
of an independent legal norm).
144. Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1014, 1015-16 (noting that most cases involve only breach of
confidence, trespass, or other illegal act, but concluding that trade secret protection should not be
limited to situations involving such an action).
145. The court does specifically note that reverse engineering and independent discovery
cannot constitute misappropriation. Id. at 1015 ("One may use his competitor's secret process if
he discovers the process by reverse engineering applied to the finished product; one may use a
competitor's process if he discovers it by his own independent research ....
"). However, this
language is not exhaustive. In other words, the court did not intimate that reverse engineering
and independent discovery are the only means by which one may obtain an idea considered a
trade secret.
146. See Kitch, supra note 93, at 697 (discussing Christopher and noting that there are two
arguments implied by the court's conclusion: "First, the law should not create incentives for
otherwise wasteful expenditures by refusing to provide legal protection. Second, to permit this
kind of information taking [the kind at issue in Christopher] will result in an incorrect level of
investment in innovation.").
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lackadaisical discussion of the misappropriation element. 147 The court
reached the correct result and must have done so with reasoning that
comports with the view of misappropriation presented in this Note,
but the court also included language arguably supportive of opposing
views of the misappropriation element.148
Some commentators, frustrated by the decision because it
infuses uncertainty into the law, conclude that the court must have
independently determined that the defendant's action constituted
some moral wrong.1 49 In fact, the following language within the
opinion provides support, although minimal, to such an argument:
"[iun general, they (means considered improper and, as such,
constituting misappropriation) are means which fall below the
generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable
conduct."'150 The court's inclusion of this language led some to believe
that the opinion is about mandating commercial morality; however,
the court cites no evidence to show that the defendant's actions violate
"generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable
conduct."'15 1 Without such evidence it seems difficult to conclude that
the action taken by the defendants was morally wrong.
The court must have reached its conclusion using a different
theory than that trade secret law is about mandating commercial
morality. The court's justification for concluding that the defendant's
action should lead to liability is that "the protections required to
prevent another's spying cost so much that the spirit of inventiveness
is dampened."'152 To the Christopher court, therefore, the innovators
satisfy the misappropriation element when the defendant's actions
147. See Christopher,431 F.2d at 1012, 1017.
148. See id.

149. E.g., Chiappetta, supra note 2, at 82-83 (1999) ("The difficulty with the court's approach
(in Christopher)...is that testing for unreasonable precautions, dampening inventive spirit and
commercial morality does not provide much analytical guidance. The court provides no basis for
determining when costs or dampening are unacceptable or where to look for standards of
commercial morality."); Bone, supra note 2, at 297-98 (identifying various theories that may
potentially support the Court's conclusion but concluding that "[n]one of the Court's policy
arguments are persuasive."); Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation:A Cost-Benefit Response to the
Fourth Amendment Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 469 (1992) ("Moralistic rhetoric figured
prominently in Christopher ....). The author of this note later conceded that "the court's
intuition that the defendant's behavior was wrongful ultimately rested upon a consideration of
DuPont's possible prevention costs .... Id. at 469-70.
150. Christopher,431 F.2d at 1016 (citing the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f). Later,
the court discussed the misappropriation element in extremely moralistic tones: "We therefore
need not proclaim a catalogue of commercial improprieties. Clearly, however, one of its
commandments does say 'thou shalt not appropriate a trade secret through deviousness under
circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not reasonably available."' Id. at 1017.
151. Id. at 1016.
152. Id.
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dampen the "spirit of inventiveness," not when the actions employed
to obtain the secret violate some universal commercial sense of
153
morality.
Christopher has also been cited for the proposition that a
competitor's actions should constitute misappropriation if an
innovator, to maintain the secrecy of her information, would have
taken precautions to the level that the benefit achieved from any
further precautions would be outweighed by the costs of implementing
such precautions. 154
The opinion includes language providing
substantial support for this conclusion: "[c]ommercial privacy must be
protected from espionage which could not have been reasonably
anticipated or prevented."1 55 With this, the court links the reasonable
precautions to misappropriation. Essentially, any action that could be
prevented only by precautions that cost more than the benefit of
enhanced secrecy provided by those precautions constitutes
misappropriation. 156
Stated differently, once an innovator takes
reasonable precautions, any taking of the idea protected by those
precautions constitutes misappropriation.1 5 7
Commentators citing Christopherfor this cost-benefit approach
frame the question of what should be considered misappropriation in
more appropriate terms than do those citing Christopher as a court
attempting to mandate commercial morality. The commentators
supporting a cost-benefit approach present the question in this form
with hopes of enhancing efficiency. However, commentators espousing

153. Id.
154. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc. 925 F.2d 174, 178-80 (7th Cir.
1991) (Posner, J.) (concluding that the reasoning in Christopherrepresents a theory supporting
insistence on the existence of reasonable precautions to reveal value of a trade secret-to make
certain that the sort of misappropriation considered actionable is the sort that could be avoided
by the innovator only by taking precautions so costly that the benefits, in terms of enhanced
secrecy, are outweighed); Note, supra note 149, at 471-73 (1992) (citing Christopherand Rockwell
Graphic Sys, Inc. for the proposition that "the cost of protective measures figures directly into a
court's determination of whether a firm took reasonable precautions under the
circumstances..." and concluding that precautions should be considered reasonable, and hence
protection afforded, when the cost of precautionary measures "equals the marginal expected
economic loss in the event of misappropriation, that is, the value of the trade secret to the owner
multiplied by the decrease in the risk that the secret will be discovered by a competitor brought
about by taking additional precautions").
For simplicity's sake, this definition of
misappropriation will be called the cost-benefit approach.
155. Christopher,431 F.2d at 1016.
156. See id. at 1017 ("[T]hou shall not appropriate a trade secret through deviousness under
circumstances in which countervailing defenses are not reasonably available.").
157. Id.

20041

THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS

1307

such a view of the misappropriation element fail to fully identify the
158
economic framework for trade secret protection.
Requiring innovators to take reasonable precautions to insure
the secrecy of their innovations forces innovators to focus efforts on
precautions as opposed to innovations. 159
Commentators citing
Christopher for the proposition that any action that could be
prevented only be innovators taking precautions the cost of which are
outweighed by the benefits resulting from enhanced secrecy demand
reasonable precautions. Demanding reasonable precautions distracts
innovators from their most economically valuable pursuit:
160
innovating.
Those proposing such a view of Christopher and of the
reasonable precautions requirement seem convinced that the
reasonable precautions element must be satisfied to invoke trade
secret protection. 16 1 Given this assumption, that the reasonable
precautions requirement cannot be divorced from trade secret law,
commentators may be most comfortable considering the element in
terms of costs and benefits. However, trade secret law need not
necessarily include the reasonable precautions requirement.
Moreover, considering whether or not the element is satisfied by
focusing on costs and benefits makes the scheme inefficient.
According to those proposing a cost-benefit approach to
misappropriation, an innovator must take precautions to a level at
which the costs of any additional precautions would outweigh the
benefit, in terms of enhanced secrecy, achieved by the precaution. 162
Were there no protection for intellectual property, this is precisely the
calculus facing an innovator. Without trade secret protection, an
innovator would decide to innovate only if the benefits of innovating
would outweigh the costs necessary to allow one to benefit from such
innovation. Without legal protection of trade secrets, the innovator's
158. See generally Kitch, supra note 93, at 696-701 (generally discussing Christopher,citing
the case as demanding that the innovator take reasonable precautions, and noting the
inefficiency of such a requirement). This Note, in contrast to Professor Kitch, concludes that
Christopher must not support the cost-benefit approach because the cost-benefit approach, as
explained by Professor Kitch, demands that the innovator take reasonable precautions, yet such
a requirement dampens the "spirit of inventiveness" that ultimately justified the court's holding.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc. 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Posner, J.).
162. Note, supra note 149, at 473 ("Courts should require firms to invest in precautionary
measures until the marginal cost of those measures equals the marginal expected economic loss
in the event of misappropriation, that is, the value of the trade secret to the owner multiplied by
the decrease in the risk that the secret will be discovered by a competitor brought about by
taking additional precautions.").
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costs would include the costs necessary to maintain the secrecy of the
innovation. Under such a scheme, a rational innovator would incur
such costs until the marginal benefit of the enhanced secrecy gained
from the precautions taken would no longer outweigh the marginal
cost of the precautions. The costs relevant in this calculus, those costs
considered by innovators without any legal protection for trade
secrets, are the exact same costs that an innovator would consider
under the cost-benefit approach. If the law does not diminish the costs
to maintaining secrecy, the innovator will not be more likely to
innovate than she would be were there no legal protection.
The cost-benefit approach to misappropriation does alter the
choice facing innovators to a small extent. In a world in which the
innovator can obtain trade secret protection only by taking
precautions up to the point at which the cost of any additional
precautions outweighs the benefits of such precautions in terms of
enhanced secrecy, the law provides the precautions that the innovator
considers inefficient to take.
The cost-benefit approach to
misappropriation thereby assumes that the individual innovator can
provide basic precautions more efficiently than can the law. 163 Once
the innovator has taken such precautions, the law provides the rest.
This Note challenges the assumption behind the cost-benefit
approach: that the market provides precautions more efficiently than
does the law. Given that the law may provide precautions more
efficiently, defining misappropriation in such a way so as to demand
that the innovator take precautions promotes inefficiency.
Consequently, the cost-benefit approach dampens the "spirit of
inventiveness" that the Christopher court found vital to trade secret
law. This spirit can be appropriately promoted only by recognizing
that all actions by which a competitor may obtain information
protected as a trade secret except for independent discovery and
reverse engineering should be considered misappropriation.
The misappropriation element allows courts to infuse market
forces into the law of trade secrets. The decision as to how to define
misappropriation presents the opportunity for courts to provide
efficient incentives to innovators. Failing to recognize the unique
nature of trade secret law, however, some courts have defined
misappropriation
to achieve other objectives including the
163. Commentators espousing an economic view of trade secret law have uniformly phrased
the question differently than this. Such commentators seem to assume, without sufficient
evidence, that the innovator must take reasonable precautions. With such an assumption,
commentators attempt to define an efficient level of protection as that which would exist outside
of law. Assuming that the innovator must take reasonable precautions is the flaw. An innovator
need not necessarily take such precautions.
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maintenance of commercial morality and the policing of confidential
relationships. 16 4 These courts maintain that misappropriation can be
found only by a physical trespass or a breach of a confidential
relationship. 1 65 Defining misappropriation in this way is inefficient.
Defining misappropriation so as to encompass only physical
trespass or breach of a confidential relationship allows competitors to
obtain an innovator's trade secrets with impunity through means
unanticipated by the innovator. If the innovator cannot estimate the
length of time it may take for competitors to obtain her secret, the
innovator cannot appropriately price her product so as to recoup her
development costs.
Consider, for example, the situation innovators would have
faced had the Christopher court reached the opposite result. 16 6 In
economic terms, there is no distinction between physical trespass and
obtaining the secret by taking aerial photographs of the plaintiffs
facility. 67 Whether the defendant obtained the secret by physical
trespass or by taking aerial photographs, the defendant's actions
would affect a market-avoiding coercive transfer. As identified by
Professor Landes and Judge Posner, forcing the parties to dicker in

164. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (providing some guidance as to actionable
misappropriation); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 437-38 (defining both improper means
and misappropriation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 40-43 (defining both

improper means and misappropriation).
165. See

RESTATEMENT

OF

TORTS

§

757(a)-(b);

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF

UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 40(a)-(b); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438; see also, e.g., E.I. Du Pont
deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (Holmes, J.) ("Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant
stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs .. "); American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 728
F.2d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the misappropriation element was satisfied because of
a breach of a confidential relationship); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953)
(premising liability for misappropriation of trade secrets on a finding of an implied confidential
relationship); Comment, supra note 53, at 383 ("Most of the cases have in fact involved
employees and breach of confidential relationship, not theft.").
166. See Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1014 ("In short, the Christophers [the defendants] argue
that for an appropriation of trade secrets to be wrongful, there must be a trespass, other illegal
conduct, or breach of a confidential relationship. We disagree.") If the court had reached the
opposite result, the defendants would have avoided liability for obtaining the plaintiffs secret
because they obtained the secret without physically trespassing on the plaintiffs property or
without breaching a confidential relationship with the plaintiff. Id. at 1013-14. Recall that the
defendants obtained the plaintiffs secret by taking aerial photographs of plaintiffs plant, which
was, at the time, under construction. Id. at 1013.
167. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 159-89 (1987); POSNER, supra note 3, at 22433. A conversion of one's property through physical trespass no more avoids the efficiency gains
of a market transaction than does obtaining one's property by taking aerial photographs. Both
activities allow the competitor to obtain the idea without dickering with the original innovator.
Since both activities are coercive transfers, there is no economic justification for differentiating
between the two. We should impose liability on both sorts of transfers.
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the marketplace would lead to a more efficient result. 168 Thus, the law
should impose liability on one who obtains the secret by taking aerial
photographs just as the law would impose liability on one who obtains
the secret by physical trespass.
Perhaps most importantly for purposes of this Note, the
original innovator can no better estimate the length of time it will
take a competitor to obtain her idea through physical trespass than
she could with aerial photography. If the innovator cannot estimate
the length of time that it will take a competitor to obtain her secret,
the innovator will be unable to develop a pricing strategy that will
allow her to recoup her development costs. Thus, such a definition of
misappropriation frustrates the efficient scheme presented by this
Note. To promote efficient outcomes, courts and commentators must
define misappropriation so as to encompass all actions by which one
may obtain another's commercial secret except for independent
discovery and reverse engineering.
V. CONCLUSION
Trade secret law is uniquely efficient. By granting an exclusive
property right limited by competitive forces, trade secret law allows
innovators to recover development costs sufficient to justify their
decision to innovate. To appropriately promote efficient innovation,
courts and commentators should abandon those aspects of the current
law grafted onto the efficient underpinnings. Ultimately, courts can
promote efficient innovation by reforming trade secret law so that it
includes only two significant elements.
First, courts should grant protection only to secret ideas.
Secrecy should present only a relatively small hurdle; an idea should
be considered sufficiently secret so long as it is not generally known
throughout the industry in which the idea has relevance. Moreover,
courts should no longer equate secrecy with reasonable precautions.
Demanding that innovators take reasonable precautions in order to
satisfy the secrecy requirement forces innovators to focus on taking
precautions rather than developing innovations. Thus, demanding
reasonable precautions leads to inefficient results.
Second, courts should hold liable anyone who obtains a secret
idea by any means except reverse engineering and independent
discovery. By granting certain methods of obtaining information
impunity, the law allows competition to limit the exclusive property
right granted to the innovator by trade secret law. To promote

168. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 159-89; POSNER, supra note 3, at 224-33.
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efficient outcomes, the law must allow competitors to obtain a trade
secret by any means for which the innovator can estimate the length
of time it would take a competitor to obtain the secret through such
means. Consequently, the law should consider improper all means by
which one may obtain information except for reverse engineering and
independent discovery.
By modifying trade secret law in accord with the proposals
found in this Note, courts would return to the efficient underpinnings
of trade secret law and establish a truly efficient intellectual property
protection scheme. This scheme would create a limited monopoly to
insure that ideas were developed. At the same time, the law would
limit that protection so that the monopoly-reducing effects of
competition remedy the problems caused by such exclusivity. Trade
secret law, slightly modified from its current form, allows courts and
commentators to achieve efficient protection of intellectual property.
Jon Chally*
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healthy dose of sibling rivalry.

